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Abstract* 
 
Do the programs that aim to promote and develop industry clusters (also known 
as Cluster Development Programs, or CDP) work? Do they have an impact on 
enterprise development? This paper offers an insight into the methods that can 
help answer these fundamental questions through solid quantitative evidence. In 
general, results will depend on the level of coordination that is achieved and on 
the actions undertaken as a result of improved coordination and strategy-setting of 
the relevant actors. The techniques of Social Network Analysis (SNA) can be 
employed to assess the evolution of coordination among cluster actors, with the 
requirement that network indicators are observed before and after the 
implementation of the CDPs. While this particular analysis can assist in 
monitoring and assessing the process of coordination and its changes throughout 
the program, other qualitative and contextual information can also assist in 
interpreting the data and, thus, increase the reliability of results. However, in 
order to properly assess the impact of CDPs, their causality needs to be explored 
further by the application of additional quantitative methods. In fact, the effects 
cannot be attributed to the program itself, unless a proper counterfactual is built 
in, such as what would have happened to the beneficiaries in the absence of the 
program. By definition, this particular counterfactual cannot be observed, but the 
application of experimental and quasi-experimental techniques can help construct 
control groups of non-beneficiaries to approximate the counterfactual and assess 
the evidence with econometric techniques. Furthermore, a detailed observation of 
cases and specific interviews can help regarding the interpretation of results 
derived from these methods. The quantitative tools discussed herein are indeed 
complementary and not alternatives, with each applied as a means to strengthen 
the explanatory capacity of the other. Each tool requires specific and challenging 
data analysis that can be achieved with careful resource planning and the 
appropriate team skill set. The overarching objective is to build new and solid 
evidence on the effectiveness of CPDs and their respective policies. 
 
 
JEL Codes: O22, O25, O29, Z13 
Keywords: cluster development programs, policy evaluation, social network 
analysis
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Introduction 
This publication provides some practical guidelines on how to measure the effectiveness of 
programs that aim to promote and develop industry clusters (also known as Cluster Development 
Programs, or CDP). The framework of this paper has two distinctive objectives. The first is to 
focus exclusively on the quantitative approach, which does not imply that the qualitative 
approach is not an important factor, when evaluating CDPs. While it is strongly believed that 
both approaches are complementary, it is essential that specific recommendations on how to 
measure the effect of CDPs be made. The second section centers on the effectiveness of CDPs. 
The second objective is a focus on CDPs effectiveness. There are important hypotheses 
that should be considered when evaluating CDPs, such as their relevance, effectiveness, and 
consistency. However, evidence of the effectiveness of CDPs requires immediate attention, both 
in terms of knowledge and accountability. This introduction addresses three key issues: (i) 
definition of Cluster Development Programs; (ii) what results are worth measuring; and (iii) how 
can the findings of this study be attributed to CDPs.  
Cluster Development Programs: Definition 
A methodological recommendation depends on an accurate definition of the subject for analysis; 
in this case, CDPs. To do this, an industry cluster first needs to be defined, which can be 
challenging in itself (Martin and Sunley, 2003), and then the public interventions required to 
promote its development need to be justified. Several definitions of industry clusters have been 
proposed over time.1 Nevertheless, a baseline definition interprets an industrial cluster to be a 
geographic group of interconnected firms and associated organizations, specialized in the same 
or related producer activities. This brings differing industry- and location-specific externalities. 
Firms, for instance, may take advantage of the concept of economies of agglomeration to 
increase their innovativeness, given the exchange of information and technological spillover that 
can exist, due to formal and informal networks between them and their associated organizations.  
                                                      
1 Becattini (1989: 132) defines the concept of industrial district as “a localized social and productive ‘thickening’”, 
held together by a “complex and tangled web of external economies and diseconomies, of joint and associated costs, 
of historical and cultural vestiges, which envelops both inter-firm and interpersonal relationships.” A simpler 
definition is derived from the work of Michael Porter (1990), who defines industrial clusters as “a geographic 
concentration of competing and cooperating companies, suppliers, service providers, and associated institutions.” 
For a comprehensive review of the industrial cluster concept’s definitions, see Giuliani (2005).  
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Successful clusters display certain characteristics. One is that organizations can provide 
specialized services to a specific group of firms within the cluster, especially in terms of 
supporting business planning, training for standards compliance, and/or accessing specialized 
research that is provided by institutions within the same cluster. A significant element of clusters 
is the development of non-market-related networks that can stem from entrepreneurs and 
workers from within the same culture and society, within a specific region. This is expected to 
improve economic coordination and reduce transaction costs.  
Economies of agglomeration and clustering are particularly relevant in the tourism 
industry. By definition, this industry is geographically concentrated, due to its dependence on the 
natural and/or cultural attractions of a specific region. In addition, the strong complementarity of 
its products and the services it provides boosts the effect of the industry’s externalities, making 
the coordination among local agents even more critical. Moreover, the tourism industry requires 
an infrastructure that is able to facilitate the movement of travelers, as well as the utilities to 
make their stays possible. The sustainability of a tourism cluster, however, may be hindered by a 
negative agglomeration of externalities, particularly when it is dependent on the natural heritage 
of a region. 
In general, economies of agglomeration are the result of a set of positive externalities that 
are, simultaneously, industry- and location-specific, and have been well documented since the 
influential work of Marshall (1920).2 These externalities are mainly due to the presence of a 
localized knowledge surplus, as well as input-sharing and labor-market pooling. Clusters are 
groups that are highly conducive to knowledge spillovers, because they allow for the transfer of 
tacit knowledge, which is not easily shared. Tacit knowledge is embodied in people and is 
difficult to articulate through codified knowledge; effective transfer of tacit knowledge requires 
personal contact and regular and direct interaction in order to be transmitted and absorbed (i.e., 
usefully employed). Hence, informal conversations between technicians and/or workers, labor 
mobility, and imitative behavior are examples of the ways tacit knowledge is communicated. The 
                                                      
2 Because of Marshall’s influential work, this phenomenon is often referred to as “Marshallian externalities.” In 
more generic terms, related literature has also referred to the concept of industry-specific local externalities (ISLE). 
Henderson, Kuncoro, and Turner (1995) refer to these types of industry-specific externalities that arise from regional 
agglomeration as “localization externalities,” in particular, when firms operate in related sectors and are closely 
located. 
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gains from knowledge spillover may only be recognized from within, or by, a related sector of 
locally concentrated firms.3 
 With goods suppliers being in proximity with, and in the same industry as the end-users 
(Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 1999) and, likewise, technology producers with the users 
(Lundvall, 1988), benefits can be drawn from a group of input suppliers within the specific 
industry. This will increase returns in the production of intermediate goods. This scenario is 
more likely to occur in the case of industry-specific services, such as business consulting, 
machine repair, and quality standards certification. In addition, labor pooling within a specific 
location in a particular sector allows local workers to train in that specific industry, without fear 
of unemployment caused by irrelevant skills. The centralization of specifically skilled human 
resources, thus, increases the concentration of firms to one locality. 
Aside from purely Marshallian externalities, scholars have emphasized the role of local 
social embeddedness. Firms in clusters may participate in social networks, which can reduce 
transaction costs and increase efficiency (Granovetter, 1985), escalate the origination and sharing 
of tacit knowledge (Powell et al., 1996; McDermott et al., 2009), reduce uncertainty by 
strengthening bargaining and lobbying power (Guillen, 2000; Khanna; Rivkin, 2001; Mesquita 
and Lazzarini, 2008), and enable cooperative action (Schmitz, 1995). 
Key questions are when is, and why is, public intervention needed to promote industrial 
clusters. It is well known in the study of economic theory that markets often fail to allocate 
resources optimally, when there is a collapse in coordination. As originally indicated by 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), investment decisions are interrelated, and the investment of one firm 
can have a positive effect on the profitability of another’s. This is particularly important when 
geographic proximity and industry complementarities create economies of agglomeration. As an 
example—and with reference to the tourism industry mentioned above—a company may have a 
profitable investment by building a restaurant, following the investment in a hotel by another 
firm. Coordination failures, therefore, can lead a local economy or an industry cluster into low 
                                                      
3 This argument was first introduced by Marshall (1920), followed by Arrow (1962), and then Romer (1986) and, 
later, formalized by Glaeser et al. (1992) as the Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) model. The endogenous growth 
theory (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Krugman, 1991) underlines the importance of knowledge spillovers and 
externalities to bring about self-reinforcement, an increase of returns-to-scale within a region, and support to the 
agglomeration of economic activities. A stream of empirical scholarly articles on this topic began with the 
influential contribution by Glaeser et al. (1992), who sought to examine the respective roles of specialization and 
diversity with regard to local and regional development (Greunz, 2004). 
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investment equilibrium, if local businesses and governments fail to coordinate investment 
decisions.4 
In this context, we can define CDPs as those public interventions that foster the beneficial 
effects of economies of agglomeration by creating a set of incentives to overcome the 
coordination failures that hamper the development of some industries in specific localities. As 
mentioned above, the idea of promoting the formation and development of clusters is based on 
the assumption that business-level performance benefits from agglomeration and, in turn, 
agglomeration facilitates coordination. 
The objective defined above may be achieved through different methods, differentiating 
CDPs significantly in terms of both conceptualization and implementation. However, most CDPs 
usually involve the following activities: 
• Motivation and mobilization of cluster stakeholders (firms, support institutions, and 
public agencies) to analyze and compare performance, capacity, and the potential of the 
local production systems. 
• Development of a vision and consensus to enhance innovation, productivity, and 
knowledge, among firms within the cluster. 
• Development and implementation of an integrated set of interventions to promote 
innovation and combined learning, overcome technological and environmental 
constraints, strengthen local innovation, and promote joint investment in local public and 
collective goods.  
 
These interventions clearly aim to improve coordination at the local level. This 
methodological toolkit will provide a comprehensive approach to CDPs, often adopted by 
governments and international organizations, and will include some or all of the activities listed 
above.5 The rationale for this kind of intervention is based on the assumption that coordination 
failures emerge at a very preliminary stage in the development of an industry cluster, and that 
public support is required to facilitate interaction and coordination among private-private and 
public-private organizations. The initial stage of intervention usually includes the preparation 
                                                      
4 For a review on coordination problems in development, see Hoff (2000). For clusters and coordination failures, see 
also Pietrobelli, Casaburi, and Maffioli (2013). 
5 The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) adopts this comprehensive approach. See Pietrobelli and Stevenson 
(2011). 
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and adoption of a CDP to coordinate and prioritize the various investment decisions of a cluster’s 
stakeholders for a systematic path towards development, where industry- and location-specific 
externalities are accounted for. As a first step, public intervention can reduce those transaction 
costs that hinder coordination among agents within a cluster.6  
The activities included in a CDP are implemented during the second stage. Investments 
often play a key role in the creation of knowledge and the adoption of technology, two of the 
major sources of industry and location-specific externalities. For this purpose, cluster technology 
development centers, generally, are financed as a group. At this stage, CDPs normally include 
the co-financing of public infrastructure and club goods. Therefore, public funding is not only 
used to reduce coordination costs, but also as a catalyst for new investment projects, both private 
and public. Sometimes these programs also co-finance the purchase of machinery, equipment to 
be collectively managed and used in co-financed technology centers by groups of firms located 
in each cluster. Thus, industry-specific production assets become club goods for the businesses 
involved in the cluster development plan.  
 Measuring the Results of CDPs 
The evaluation of the two-stage intervention described above—the first mainly focused on 
solving pure coordination problems, and the second centered on implementing a set of 
coordinated private and public investments—involves the use of various kinds of measures. The 
assessment of the first stage requires measures that can capture the creation and/or strength of 
different kinds of interrelationships between firms and/or other stakeholders during the 
preparation and adoption of a CDP. A fundamental approach for this purpose is the Social 
Network Analysis (SNA). As this paper shows later, SNA applies graph theory to measure 
networks in quantitative terms (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) and to examine their structural 
properties, as well as to identify the position that differing agents occupy within networks.  
The second stage requires measures relating to the expected effects of the implementation 
of the activities included in a CDP. Since the goal of a CDP is always related to fostering local 
economic development, this toolkit will focus on the outcomes related to increased output. 
Concentration will, thus, primarily be aimed at productivity and its related outcomes, such as 
                                                      
6 Maffioli (2005) illustrates different roles that public agents can play in reducing coordination costs and inducing 
the formation of socially desirable networks that would not spontaneously arise otherwise. In particular, a public 
actor can play the role of coordinator, and modify the structure of firms’ payoffs announcing that it is willing to 
cover part of the connection and coordination costs. 
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innovation, investment, export, and market share. Given that incentives to foster coordination are 
put in place at this stage, the strength and variety of firms’ relationships with other businesses 
and the relevant cluster’s organizations will be a key intermediate outcome to be evaluated. As 
already mentioned, the SNA tool provides a way of measuring that can be used for this purpose. 
This toolkit mainly relates to measurement at the business level (without disregarding 
measurement at the level of specific clusters and localities), and includes attention to potential 
spillover effects and externalities.  
Attributing Observed Results to CDPs 
This toolkit will especially focus on the question of whether CDPs work or not. In other words, 
are CDPs able to deliver expected results? In seeking an answer, two parallel evaluation 
processes will take place. One will assess the progress of the first stage of a CDP, focusing on 
whether and how coordination among cluster stakeholders changed over time. The other will 
focus directly on impact evaluation to establish whether the CDP is the key driver of the 
observed results. Assessment of the process of coordination is easier, in terms of data 
requirement and analyses, than evaluating the causal impact of CDPs on cluster performance, 
although both are important complementary dimensions of the CDP evaluation process. An 
appraisal of the coordination among cluster stakeholders requires that network indicators are 
observed before and after the implementation of a CDP, but it does not necessarily require a 
control group. It is obvious that this analysis will only assist in monitoring the process of 
coordination and its changes along the project’s lifetime while, at the same time, qualitative and 
contextual information can be collected to aid in the interpretation of data and increase the 
reliability of results. Sections 2 and 3 will illustrate, in detail, how the analysis can be carried 
out.  
To properly assess the outcomes of a CDP, more sophisticated methods are essential to 
determine causality, in particular, one has to deal with the fundamental problem of attribution 
effects. For this purpose, several techniques have been developed, according to literature relating 
to policy evaluation. Most of these techniques are based on the idea of constructing a proper 
counterfactual scenario that represents what might have happened to the beneficiaries in the 
absence of a program. Because this counterfactual scenario, by definition, is not apparent (a firm 
cannot simultaneously be in a position to receive or not receive a specific benefit), control groups 
12 
 
of non-beneficiaries have been constructed to approximate the counterfactual scenario (see 
Section 4 for an in-depth methodological discussion).  
Structure of the Toolkit 
The toolkit is structured as follows. Section 1 will define the typical research questions and 
specific objectives of a CDP evaluation study. Section 2 will describe a set of key indicators to 
be used for measuring coordination and evaluating the impact of a CDP on performance. Section 
3 will include data requirements and the methods used for data collection. Section 4 will discuss 
the attribution problem and outline the methods for assessing the CDP’s impact on performance. 
Finally, Section 5 will conclude with a discussion relating to the practical issues involved in a 
CDP evaluation study.  
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1. The Logic of CDP Research Questions in Evaluation 
In defining what the specific objective of the analysis is, discussion will center on the 
justification, intervention logic, and structure of a typical CDP. Given the variety of approaches 
relating to a CDP that have been developed over time by policymakers around the world, this 
will prove simple. However, as mentioned in the above Introduction, it is an essential step 
towards defining the scope of this methodological proposal. Moreover, it will reflect a specific 
type of CPD that has been widely adopted in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region, 
often with the support of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).  
	  
1.1. CDP in Practice: Some Elements of the IDB Experience7 
1.1.1. The First Stage: Strategy Design and Coordination  
As mentioned above, a CDP typically starts with an initial phase, where public intervention is 
needed to coordinate and prioritize the various decisions of cluster actors within a proposed 
cluster or area. This takes place through the preparation and adoption of cluster development 
plans, which set out, in detail, agreed initiatives to promote its development. In some cases, the 
coordination of activities may be less formal, and may include marginalized actors in local 
communities. Box 1 illustrates how the first phase of a CDP is defined.  
 
Box 1. Example of the Design and Coordination Stage of a Typical CDP 
Cluster Competitiveness Support Program for Minas Gerais, Brazil 
A specific set of activities was designed within a program, in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais, to assist 
in the coordination of different clusters, to promote institutions through local government entities (EGLs), 
as well as prepare proposals for improved competitiveness (Planos de Melhoramento da 
Competitividade, or PMCs). It followed a participatory process engaging the clusters’ firms and related 
institutions. The PMCs had to include, at least, (a) a definition of the cluster’s type of business and the 
firms and related institutions that comprised it; (b) a medium- and long-term strategy for positioning the 
business within the domestic and international markets; (c) a diagnostic study of the current status of the 
cluster, including its social and environmental approaches and strategy to achieve the various objectives 
proposed; and (d) a proposal for the services and contributions under each of the program’s lines of 
support, with justification for each line of support. The last component was the source of finance required 
for the diagnostics, workshops, surveys, studies, and TA (technical assistance) under the PMCs for all the 
clusters in order to strengthen the EGLs. 
                                                      
7 This section draws on Pietrobelli and Stevenson (2011) (see http://www.iadb.org/en/publications/publication-
detail,7101.html?id=26526%20&dcLanguage=en&dcType=All), where these elements are analyzed in greater 
detail. 
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This first phase encompasses the key mechanism at the base of a CDP in resolving 
coordination problems and creating or strengthening the different types of inter-organizational 
networks. While seeking to resolve coordination problems is a constant throughout the overall 
implementation of a CDP, it is clear that cluster competitiveness development proposals play a 
key role in defining how coordination can occur and what incentives there are to encourage 
investment. In this regard, the effort to determine and strengthen cluster governance in the initial 
stage is especially relevant.  
Strategy design and relevant coordination requires thorough research, analysis, and 
consultation. Essential to this are the selection of clusters and the identification of key 
stakeholders (bold entrepreneurs, as well as local leaders, civil society, and committed public 
officials). Subsequently, workshops and consultation should take place—usually beginning at the 
policy level, with the selected clusters and sectors, and then within each cluster—to establish the 
priorities and activities. During the diagnostic stage, continuous analyses and consultation with 
stakeholders are carried out to identify the main barriers hindering the competitiveness of the 
industry and of individual firms.  
Another essential component in the initial phase relates to the supervision of a program as 
a means to promote public and private dialogue, both at the program and cluster levels. In this 
regard, the institutional capacity of public institutions engaged in this type of program and the 
degree of liaison with the private sector are crucial to the success of a CPD.  
Included in the inception phase are a detailed analysis of each cluster to identify the gaps; 
a benchmark, created by comparing other sectors and industries in comparable countries; and a 
list of the main activities to be carried out during implementation of the program. The aim is to 
avoid the failures that some markets have experienced and ensure coordination in private and 
public activities. In order to maximize impact, a series of parallel activities to improve the 
business climate is necessary. This may include removing the regulatory bottlenecks for starting 
and managing a firm, investing in key infrastructures to reduce market access costs, or 
implementing training programs that improve the human resource capacity to serve the local 
industry.  
As mentioned above, one of the most challenging aspects of a CDP is the complexity of 
its implementation and its supervision. Usually a national or local public institution administers 
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the program through an executing agency. This can be a government agency in charge of the 
promotion of private sector development and competitiveness at the national or local level, or a 
unit created by the relevant ministry. In addition, the executing agency is usually in charge of the 
coordination between the different public entities, both at the national and subnational levels. 
Guidelines, strategy, and monitoring of the program’s results are typically the responsibility of a 
public-private strategy council. The selection and number of participants and the legal nature of 
the council are defined on a case-by-case basis, with stakeholders from the public and the private 
sectors included. In some cases, a cluster will have its own governance structure, presenting its 
proposals to the council. The council, in turn, will consider the governance structure representing 
the interests of the local actors and, thus, determine which entity is better placed to administer it. 
It could be a university, an association, or a government agency. 
 
Figure 1. Typical Institutional Structure of an IDB Cluster Program 
Clusters	  Governance
Public	  Agencies	  ｜ Private	  
Firms	  ｜ Research	  Centers	  
｜ Universities
Executing	  
Agency
Private	  Firms	  of	  Selected	  Clusters
Public	  -­‐ Private	  
Council	  (PPC)
Needs
Strategy
Resources
Business	  
Development	  
Services
Horizontal	  
Policies
International	  
Consulting	  
Studies
Local	  
Consulting	  
Support
Club	  Goods
Infrastructure
Services
Execution	  and	  
administration	  
of	  project
Defines	  
strategy	  and	  
monitors	  the	  
program
 
  Source: Pietrobelli and Stevenson (2011). 
 
Figure 1 exhibits the typical structure of a cluster development program. The executing agency 
interacts with a public-private council that establishes the strategic objectives of a program, as 
well as monitors it. Resources are allocated by the executing agency to carry out the various 
activities that are instrumental to promoting the competitiveness and development of the cluster, 
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such as the provision of business development services, investment in the infrastructure of club 
goods, or contribution of TA. Private firms participate in the program, and collaborate to create 
and oversee the administration of the cluster, together with other relevant organizations, such as 
government agencies, research centers, and universities. 
 
1.1.2.  The Second Stage: Implementation of a CDP 
The second phase of a CDP includes the implementation of specific activities that may vary, 
depending on the program’s objectives and on the analysis and proposals developed in the initial 
stage. Firms may have access to the resources of a CDP, according to a pre-defined set of 
criteria, and these can be used to finance the projects that are selected to support the strategic 
objectives of the proposal for enhancing the competitiveness of a cluster. These projects are 
presented to the various participants in the cluster, and must prove to be sustainable, both in 
financial, environmental and social terms, and innovation, benefitting the cluster as a whole and 
generating externalities and local public goods. The main components of a CDP, therefore, 
usually include investment in knowledge creation and technology, two of the major sources for 
industry and location-specific externalities. In addition, a program may include components for 
not only institutional strengthening, but also for the promotion of overall business cooperation 
and integration, and for reforms to enhance the business climate. Some programs may also 
include a factor for access to finance. 
1.2. Key Questions Relating to the Evaluation of a Typical CDP 
1.2.1. Effectiveness in Terms of Increased Coordination and of Program 
Delivery 
As mentioned above, the main objective during the first stage of development of a CDP is the 
coordination of the different actors in a cluster. In the CDP discussed above, it is expected that 
coordination has evolved and become strengthened as the project moves towards implementation 
in the second stage. Hence, a key goal of a CDP impact evaluation study should be the 
measurement of actor coordination over the duration of a project and beyond.8 Focus should, 
therefore, be placed on identifying the changes in the indicators that relate to increasing 
coordination, which would determine modification of the relationships or—to use a more 
                                                      
8 It should be noted that each CDP generates a number of coordination activities that start during the first stage and 
that are meant to last and change during the implementation stage and beyond that.  
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common term in the area of international development—linkages among cluster actors, as the 
program progresses. The overall key question at this stage should be: How did the CDP affect the 
coordination among the different cluster actors? 
More specifically: 
1. How did the CDP affect the structure of the linkages (i.e., network) among cluster 
actors during the first and second stages of the project? 
2. Are these changes, if any, in the network a sign of increased coordination?  
 
These two questions imply both the quantity and quality of the linkages among cluster 
actors. Specifics relating to changes in coordination will depend on the design and objective of 
each CDP. Hence, program evaluators will need to model their coordination research questions 
according to the specific objectives of each CDP. For example, some CDPs may require 
strengthening horizontal coordination between firms that operate at the same stage of the value 
chain. If policymakers intend coordination to be stronger as one of the results of a CDP (i.e., the 
number of linkages between relevant firms is increased), then an important question would be: 
Did the density of inter-firm linkages increase during and after the CDP?  
Other CDPs may focus more on a vertical coordination between a group of small firms 
and one or two larger corporations (such as subsidiaries of multinational corporations or large 
domestic firms) or major organizations (such as a food laboratory for agro-industrial producers, a 
design institute for garment producers, or a metrology/quality control/certification organization 
in the case of metalworking producers). In this case, program evaluators should not only seek 
whether overall connectivity has increased but, rather, whether such coordination has moved 
towards a different form of governance. The appropriate question to raise would be: How has the 
configuration of network ties, reflecting the governance mode within the cluster, changed during 
the first and second stages of the CDP?  
Box 2 offers examples of CDPs that targeted different kinds of networks, showing that 
they often target both horizontal and vertical linkages among cluster actors (and others in their 
proximity). For appropriate research and evaluation question(s), program evaluators should 
have a clear knowledge of what the coordination objectives are in a CDP, which should have 
been included at the policy stage. CDPs often aim at increasing coordination without a specific 
concept in place. On the other hand, it is possible to extrapolate more specific objectives, as 
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those illustrated earlier. The more evaluators there are to clarify this point, the more they will be 
able to develop key questions relating to the coordination evaluation.  
 
Box 2: CDPs That Target Different Forms of Relationships 
The CDP in Cali, Colombia, strengthened collaboration among more than 200 producers of Uva Isabella, a 
company of Isabella grape products. The program’s goal was to improve trade relations with larger 
international markets. In terms of linkages among cluster actors, this indicated stronger relationships 
between many small producers and a few larger agro-industrial producers (vertical linkages), as well as an 
improved horizontal coordination among small producers to introduce an electronic monitoring and 
evaluation system and better quality control. This would reinforce the bargaining power of the small 
producers vis à vis the larger agro-industrial producers. Similarly, the CDP of the Cordoba software cluster 
in Argentina aimed at not only strengthening horizontal collaboration among producers for TA to gain 
Capability Maturity Model (CMM) certification and lobby for sector regulation, but also strengthening 
vertical collaboration with tertiary training institutions for the required technical skills. In the CDP of 
Santiago de los Caballeros, Dominican Republic, furniture producers developed stronger horizontal 
relationships to jointly obtain inputs and technical assistance, as well as jointly bid for tenders. The CDP of 
Atuntaqui, Ecuador, included the enhancement of the technological progress of the garment manufacturers 
in Atuntaqui through, among other things, stronger linkages with technical service centers that were also 
supported by the project. 
 
Note: The above examples are drawn from various projects of the Multilateral Investment Fund/IDB and 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Details can be found in Dini et al. (2007). 
 
1.2.2. Effectiveness in Terms of a Firm’s Increase in Performance 
Key questions related to the expected outcomes of CDPs on the performance of firms are the 
following: 
1. What is the effect of the CDP on the performance of firms? 
2. What is the effect of the CDP on the performance of firms, due to a change in their 
respective social network? 
 
For a response, the causality needs to be addressed more importantly than the correlations; that 
is, what is the change in performance due to the CDP. Of interest is the effect of the CDP, both 
on the firms participating (direct beneficiaries), as well as on the firms that do not participate in 
the CDP, but receive spillover from participants (indirect beneficiaries).  
There are other questions that program evaluators will need to seek responses to. First is 
the effect of the CDP on the different measures of performance, such as on a firm’s productivity 
or sales growth. Second is the heterogeneity of the effect—whether the effect of the CDP is 
larger (or smaller) for small firms, or whether it is different for firms in different industries, or 
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for firms in a different stage of development. A third question relates to the dynamics of the 
effect. For example, is the effect of the program a result of its initial years of undertaking, or will 
it be necessary to wait some years before the effect can be identified? Further, still, is the 
question that relates to some CDPs using different instruments, such as credit and/or TA. In this 
case, what is the effect of each type of instrument or combination of instruments? It is also 
possible to combine questions, such as whether the effect on small firms is more rapid than that 
on larger ones, or whether a particular instrument has a consequence for small or newly 
established businesses. 
It is necessary to note that addressing the heterogeneity of the effect, itself, or the effect 
of different instruments, requires a large number of treated and untreated businesses firms. If 
there are not enough treated (or control) firms in some categories of firms or type of instruments, 
it is not possible to detect the effect of the CDP (even if there is one). Section 4 of the toolkit will 
include the ideal quantity of firms needed for evaluation.  
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2. Indicators 
2.1. Social Network Analysis: Measuring CDP Effects on Coordination  
Given that strengthening coordination is one of the objectives of most CDPs, this toolkit will 
provide guidance to program evaluators in the employment of quantitative methods to measure 
achievements. The methods are based on the application of SNA, mentioned above, and are 
detailed in more depth in Giuliani and Pietrobelli (2011). SNA uses graph theory to measure 
coordination, which, in the context of this publication, refers to the inter-organizational networks 
formed by cluster actors. SNA methods can be applied for at least two purposes: first, to measure 
the position of individual actors within a network and, second, to measure the way linkages are 
distributed within a network (i.e., the network structure). These are further described below. 
2.1.1 Measuring an Actor-level Position Within a Network 
There are different measures that can be employed by CDP evaluators to establish where actors 
are positioned within a network, depending on the objectives of the program. Table 1 illustrates 
some of the most popular concepts and measures. Each measure can be applied to observe how 
the position of key actors within a cluster changes during the different stages of a CDP. Degree 
centrality (Table 1 (a)) is measured by the number of direct ties an actor maintains with others 
within the network, and it signals the access to the resources that are transferred through the 
network, such that highly centralized actors have better access to resources than those who are 
disconnected or on the periphery. 
In other cases, it is not the number of direct links that results in a positional advantage. 
Centrality, in certain cases, empowers, and empowerment is a result of being connected to those 
who are weaker, as being connected to powerful others that have many potential trading partners 
reduces one's bargaining power. Hence, the power of one actor within the network may be 
related to the many direct links that actor has, as well as to the little ties of its direct contacts 
(Table 1(b)). However, the opposite may be true if the “central” actor, such as a large 
multinational firm, is expected to distribute services (assets) to the other cluster firms.  
Another measure of centrality, “betweenness” centrality, relates to the degree to which 
one actor is vital in a network in connecting actors that otherwise would not be connected (Table 
1 (c)). Betweenness centrality is critical if program evaluators wish to identify and follow, over 
time, the bridging actors; that is, actors that are indispensable in maintaining parts of the network 
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(e.g., two different sectors) connected to each other. This may be the case in terms of firms, 
agencies, and buyers, which play the role of “brokers” within a cluster. 
 
Table 1. Examples of Network Positions, Beneficial Effects, and Limitations 
SNA concept Brief 
description 
Illustration Advantages/ 
benefits 
Limits 
(a)  
Degree 
centrality 
Number of direct 
ties an actor has 
with others 
within the 
network. 
AB
G
D
E
C
F
 
Easy access to 
information, 
knowledge, and any 
type of resource. 
Too many 
connections can be 
time-consuming, not 
always rewarding. 
(b) 
Bonacich 
centrality 
Centrality of an 
actor, dependent 
upon the 
centrality of its 
direct contacts 
(alters). 
AB
G
D
E
C
F
 
Power (if alters have 
low centrality), access 
to resources (if alters 
have high centrality). 
Too many 
connections may 
overload the actor.  
(c) 
Betweenness 
centrality (see 
also “structural 
holes”) 
Degree to which 
an actor is able 
to connect others 
that will be 
otherwise 
disconnected. 
A
B
G D
E
C
F
 
Gatekeeping, 
influence, 
dependence, control. 
If there are only a 
few actors with high 
betweenness 
centrality, they may 
easily disrupt the 
network 
(vulnerability risk).  
(d) 
Closed ties 
High local 
connectivity 
between an 
actor’s alters. 
AB
G
D
E
C
F
 
High trust, quality 
knowledge, joint 
problem-solving, 
reduction of 
transaction costs. 
Too much closure is 
detrimental and leads 
to lock-in. 
(e)  
Structural holes 
(see also 
“betweenness 
centrality”) 
When an actor’s 
alters are not/are 
poorly 
connected to 
each other. 
A
B
G
D
E
C
F
 
High level of 
knowledge diversity, 
high opportunities for 
creativity and radical 
innovation, efficiency 
and control in links. 
Does not have the 
advantages of 
network closure. 
Source: Giuliani and Pietrobelli (2011). 
 
Positional advantages also depend on the degree to which the alters of actors are (or not) 
connected to each other. Concentrated local connectivity of alters (Table 1 (d)) often conveys a 
high level of trust and quality of knowledge to relationships, while the lack of connectivity 
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between alters (technically, the presence of “structural holes” (Table 1 (e)), brings access to 
diverse knowledge and resources, since actors that are not connected to each other tend to be 
different.  
2.1.2 Measuring a Network’s Structural Properties  
The advantages and limitations of different network positions discussed, so far, refer to the 
individual firms and may not hold true for a cluster, as a whole. In fact, the high centrality of 
some businesses, in some cases, may even be detrimental for other firms within the cluster. To 
understand the overall advantages of a network, it is necessary to study its structural properties 
on a case-by-case basis, and consider the underlying business and industry strategies.  
Table 2 presents examples of measures for network structure. The study of network 
structures often includes a process for identifying the subgroups of actors that display a higher-
than-average connectivity than the rest of the actors within the network: “…subset of actors 
among whom there are relatively strong, direct, intense, frequent, or positive ties” (Wasserman 
and Faust, 1994: 249). Single cohesive subgroups are known as “cliques,” which incorporate at 
least three actors connected to each other within a network. A giant clique could include 
hundreds of actors, each connected to the other (Table 2 (a)). Provided that the links have some 
valuable content, a network with cliques has the advantage of ensuring a cooperative 
environment, where social monitoring, trust, and resource-sharing would be high. Furthermore, a 
cliquish network can be considered to be a non-hierarchical space, where resources are 
distributed in a highly egalitarian manner. In reality, however, very few networks are fully 
cliquish. This is why most CDPs, generally, aim to increase network density and to achieve 
highly cliquish structures. However, it is important to bear in mind that networks that are too 
densely connected may have drawbacks, given that many links are costly to maintain and are not 
always rewarding. As an example, in the case of an export consortium with a multitude of 
participants, more ambitious coordination activities (such as brand creation, collective quality 
control, and insurance) can be harder to implement.  
Contrary to previous belief, other network structures—while being less dense—may also 
bring advantages for firms and their clusters. In small networks (Table 2 (b)), cliques can be 
connected to each other by sparse or weak links (Table 2 (b) (i)). In larger networks, this 
structural feature has become known as “small world” (Table 2 (b) (ii)). What characterizes 
“small world,” is that actors have dense connections to their neighbors (local cliques) and, at the 
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same time, have sparse connection to other distant actors (clique-spanning links). This particular 
structure benefits from a high level of local trust, and is conducive to a cooperative environment. 
At the same time, it ensures that local cliques do not remain isolated, given that some of its 
members are also connected to distant actors. Small worlds are, therefore, efficient structures, 
minimizing the number of links and, at the same time, allowing diverse knowledge coming from 
distant actors to be accessed or exchanged by local actors. This occurs when local clusters openly 
engage in relationships and collaborate with distant actors, buyers, and global value chains—a 
determinant of the remarkable industrial success of Taiwanese firms (Guerrieri et al., 2003).  
Frequently, cluster networks appear to be organized along a “core-periphery” structure 
(Table 2 (c)), characterized by a densely connected core (a clique-like subgroup) and a set of 
“hangers-on” actors (i.e., the periphery), which are loosely connected to the core and very 
loosely connected among themselves (Borgatti and Everett, 1999). Core-periphery structures 
tend to signal the presence of an elite group (the core), which exchanges resources and shares 
assets with great frequency, while peripheral firms are often at a disadvantage. This structure 
reveals a lot to policymakers, since it highlights the existence of an elite group of firms and how 
they relate with the other firms or organizations on the periphery. A CDP that reduces the 
exclusion of producers from a local network should change the core-periphery structure into a 
less hierarchical one. It is essential, therefore, to understand whether the latter structure is present 
within a cluster and, if so, whether, and in what direction, it has changed during the various 
stages of the CDP. There could be an indication of a process of selective creative destruction, 
gradually marginalizing the less efficient and dynamic firms in the cluster. This, nevertheless, 
could be considered positive, if it coexists with a dynamic group of new firms.  
To reiterate, program evaluators need to ensure that the evaluation research undertaken is 
relevant to the type of structure of the network. The Chilean wine cluster of Colchagua is a valid 
example of this structure (Giuliani and Bell, 2005). The firms with the strongest knowledge base 
in the cluster constitute the core, while the weaker ones tend to be positioned at the periphery. 
Giuliani (2013) found that the core firms reinforced their position over time, while many of the 
weakest firms either exited the industry or remained peripheral. This core-periphery structure 
bears some advantages: it enables the circulation of high-quality and constructive knowledge 
among the densely connected core firms that have considerable potential to upgrade the 
knowledge base and facilitate the transfer of this knowledge. At the same time, the continuity of 
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a core-periphery structure will minimize the risk that transferred knowledge can be 
“downgraded” by firms with a weaker knowledge base, since these latter firms are consistently 
in marginal network positions.  
 
Table 2. Examples of Network Structures: Advantages and Limitations 
SNA concept Brief description Illustration Advantages/benefits Limits 
(a) 
A single cohesive 
set (clique) 
A dense network, 
where (almost) all 
actors are 
connected to each 
other. 
AB
D C
 
High level of trust, 
cooperation, support, 
and social 
monitoring. 
Redundant 
linkages, high 
opportunity costs, 
risk of “getting 
trapped in their 
own net.” 
(b) 
Small worlds 
Non-overlapping 
cliques (high local 
closeness), 
connected by a 
few links with 
distant actors. AB
D C
HE
F G
HE
G
 
Efficient structure, 
local dense links 
(trust and 
cooperation), and 
distant links 
(competitive 
advantage, search for 
diversity). 
Success is 
dependent on 
actors with local 
and distant links. 
(i) Small cliquish structure 
 
(ii) Small worlds 
(c) 
Core-periphery  
A core of densely 
connected firms 
and a periphery 
with a few 
connections to the 
core and little 
intra-periphery 
links. 
A
B
D C
H
F
G
H
E
G
G
 
Core actors, as well 
as actors connecting 
the core to the 
periphery, may have 
advantages. 
Hierarchical 
structure; 
peripheral actors 
may suffer 
exclusion; uneven 
network structure. 
(d)  
Scale-free 
Few hub firms 
holding all the 
connections, 
“orchestrating” a 
network. 
 
Hierarchical and 
organized 
management of the 
value chain.  
Very uneven 
structure; 
polarization of 
power and 
resources in a few 
actors; vulnerable 
to attacks to hubs. 
Source: Giuliani and Pietrobelli (2011). 
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Finally, there are structures that are even more hierarchical than the core-periphery one 
described above, such as the “scale free” networks (Table 2 (d)). These are characterized by a 
few actors behaving as hubs and holding an outstanding number of connections, while the vast 
majority of actors are poorly connected (Barabasi and Albert, 1999). This type of structure is, 
generally, the result of a rich-get-richer mechanism of network growth, by which some actors 
tend to gain more linkages over time at the expense of others, and become more powerful and 
central within the network. Such networks tend to be very hierarchical and distribute resources 
and knowledge in a very uneven and polarized way. Clusters that are characterized by scale-free 
networks reflect the well-known “hub-and-spoke” cluster typology (Markusen, 1996: 298); that 
is, a cluster typified by “(…) a business structure is dominated by one or several large vertically-
integrated firms surrounded by suppliers (…)” Detecting structures that fit, or are close to fitting, 
a scale-free network is important for those CDPs that aim to create a hierarchical structure, led 
by one or a few leading actors, and aim to monitor how its changes during and subsequent to the 
CDP implementation stage. Scale-free networks need not be anchored to a firm. In other cases, 
policymakers may have an interest in promoting the centrality of a public or public-private 
organization, which is expected to facilitate the upgrading of a firm (see the case of the Mendoza 
wine cluster in McDermott et al. [2009]).  
2.1.3 Considerations Regarding the Use of SNA Measures and their Meaning  
Caution is advised when determining the advantages and disadvantages of different network 
positions; they need to be considered in terms of where the networks are formed, including the 
quality of the linkages (their nature and value). In addition, the characteristics of the individual 
actors within the network will reveal to what degree an actor is able to leverage its positional 
advantage and what the overall benefits of the network will be. For example, a network of 
unskilled workers is less likely to generate innovation compared to one with qualified engineers, 
even if the two networks are alike in terms of structure. Likewise, two actors in the same 
network position (e.g., high betweenness centrality) may take advantage of their position, 
according to their respective skills and those of the other actors with whom they each are linked.  
Moreover, impact evaluators should recognize that it is not always possible to find a 
network position or structure that is optimal because this may vary from case to case. The 
discussion above highlighted the potential benefits and the drawbacks of each type of position 
and structure. SNA can be used to track changes along the duration of the program’s 
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implementation, as well as subsequently. The advantages or disadvantages that such changes 
may expose will need to be assessed, on a case-by-case basis, and in the context of when the 
program had been implemented. For example, the promotion of a dense network may be 
advantageous in a case where a CDP is meant to create or increase a cluster’s social capital. In an 
artisan cluster, where small entrepreneurs do not trust each other and live in constant conflict, it 
may be beneficial to increase the network’s density, so as to encourage trust between them.  
CDPs, on the other hand, may have other objectives. A group of densely connected 
aspiring entrepreneurs may already exist before a CDP is put in place, in which case the policy 
objective is to increase their connectivity with weaker firms. This would call for a core-periphery 
structure, where the core is represented by the aspiring entrepreneurs and the periphery is 
composed of the weaker firms. In a recent impact evaluation study, carried out in a cluster of the 
electronics industry in Cordoba, Argentina, Giuliani and Matta (2012) discovered that this CDP 
had had an impact on the development of new linkages, subsequent to policy treatment, although 
they did not contribute to discounting the pre-existing network structure, which had been 
measured two years after the start of the CDP. The authors observed a highly centralized 
structure, somewhat resembling a core-periphery structure (where the core firms played a critical 
role in maintaining the network connections over time, as well as ensuring its structural stability 
in a path-dependent manner). The authors concluded, for the above reasons, that this type of 
network structure could be beneficial for members—and the cluster, as a whole—provided the 
core firms were prepared to collaborate with new entrants and with the existing actors on the 
periphery. Failing this would result in those latter firms not benefiting from spillovers and 
geographic proximity.  
To summarize, it is essential that policymakers and team members discuss together the 
basic features of a CDP’s potential network structure at the end of program treatment. In doing 
so, they must take into account all the factors relating to the firms within the cluster.  
2.1.4 Stochastic Actor-oriented Models for Network Change  
Using SNA, it is possible to study the effects of a CDP on network changes. Networks are 
dynamic by nature, and relationships tend to change over time, with new ones being formed and 
others cemented or disbanded. Such changes may be the result of concurrent effects and random 
residual influences. The non-random effects that drive network change may be classified into 
three types: (1) those that relate to the structural position of the actors within the network (i.e., 
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structural or endogenous); (2) those that depend on the actors’ own attributes or characteristics 
(i.e., actor covariates); and (3) those that relate to variables depending on a pair of actors (i.e., 
dyadic covariates). Stochastic actor-oriented models (SAOM) for network dynamics are 
considered to be the most favorable models that allow for the statistical assumption of network 
dynamics, by simultaneously analyzing the impact of these different types of effects on network 
change. Excluding the technical aspects of SAOM methodologies (Snijders, 2001; 2005; Snijders 
et al., 2010) these approaches can be used to determine whether a firm’s participation in a CDP 
(including within a set of CDP initiatives) relates to the formation of new linkages, controlling 
for a set of other structural, covariate, and dyadic covariate effects that could simultaneously 
influence the formation of new linkages.  
To apply this model, at least two studies will need to be undertaken (two-wave panel 
analysis) to collect the relevant data prior to, and after, implementation of the CPD. It is also 
recommended to have a third one-wave collection undertaken during program implementation, 
as well as to use full network data, although entry/exit and missing data are allowed in the 
model. 
 
2.2.  Measures of Efficiency (Productivity and Intermediate Outcomes)  
To assess the impact of a CDP on the performance of firms, there are several indicators, which 
can be used as outcome variables.9 These relate to productivity, exports, innovation, and 
employment (Box 3).  
 
2.2.1. Productivity 
There are several measures relating to the productivity of firms, two of which are to consider the 
productivity of one input, such as labor productivity, or to consider the productivity of all inputs, 
such as total factor productivity (TFP). 
Measuring productivity is not a straightforward task. In the case of labor productivity, it 
is measured as the ratio of output to labor input, and requires some attention. Ideally, it should be 
measured as the quantity of produced goods, together with the hours worked to obtain those 
goods. In practice, however, businesses produce various goods, and labor may not be 
                                                      
9 As noted by Gertler et al. (2011), good indicators have to be SMART; that is, Specific, Measurable, Attributable, 
Realistic, and Targeted. 
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homogeneous. In this case, in terms of output, the real value of sales (or the real value added) 
should be used. In terms of labor input, the number of employees (or the real labor cost) is 
normally used. Nominal variables need to be deflated to obtain real variables, and in order to do 
this effectively, a company-specific price index should be applied although, in practice, most 
studies use industry-level price indices, given that data on prices at the firm-level may not be 
available. For information on the use of company-level price indices, see Foster et al. (2008).  
With regard to TFP, all matters related to the measurement of output and inputs are 
present, although there are additional ones that should be considered in relation to the methods 
applied. TFP is not observed but, generally, can be obtained as a residual; that is, change in 
output cannot be explained by change in input. Several methods exist to obtain TFP, all of which 
hint to varying assumptions relating to the production process and the degree to which the 
market is competitive. This suggests that each method has strengths and weaknesses.10  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
10 For further literature on estimating productivity at the firm or establishment level, see Hulten (2001), Bartelsman 
and Doms (2002), Van Biesebroeck (2007), and Syverson (2011). 
Box 3. Required Information for Measuring Outcome Indicators 
(a) Firm-level productivity 
• Annual value of production 
• Number of employees (number of permanent and temporary employees) 
• Materials (value of materials used in the production process) 
• Capital stock (net book value of machinery and equipment) 
• Labor cost. 
 
(b) Export-related indicators 
• Value of exports 
• Number of products exported  
• Number of countries to where exports are made. 
 
(c) Innovation-related indicators 
• R&D expenditures 
• Product innovation 
• Process innovation. 
 
(d) Employment-related indicators 
• Number of employees by type of education 
• Wages. 
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The simplest way to measure the change in TFP is using the Solow Residual. Suppose the 
production function has the form Yit = Ait F(Lit,Kit), where Yit is the annual real value added, Lit 
is the number of worked hours during the year, Kit is real value of the stock of capital, and Ait is 
TFP. Then, if F(.) is homogeneous of degree one (i.e., under constant return to scale), the change 
in TFP can be obtained by11 
     Δait = Δyit – αLit Δlit – αKit Δkit  
where lower cases represent the log of upper cases, Δ measures the annual change, and αLit and 
αKit are the average of the cost share of labor and capital in t and t-1. The cost share of labor, αL, 
is the ratio between labor cost and total cost, and the cost share of capital is equal to 1– αL.12  
When the interest is in the productivity of some industry or of a region, it is also 
important to study the reallocation of resources between firms. If more productive companies 
gain market share, there is an improvement in the aggregate level of productivity, since the 
aggregate level of productivity is a weighted average of the productivity of each unit. Usually, 
the weight is the market share but, in some cases, the employment share is used as weight. The 
entry and exit of firms from the market also affect the growth of the aggregate level of 
productivity. If entrants are more productive than incumbents, there is an improvement in 
productivity. Similarly, if exiting firms are less productive than continuing ones, the exit of those 
firms implies an increase in the aggregate level of productivity. Therefore, to address the effect 
of a CDP at the aggregate level, it is necessary to evaluate its effect on the productivity and 
growth—measured by sales or employment—of each firm and on the firm’s decision to enter or 
exit the market. There are several variables that are related to productivity, such as the value of 
exports, R&D expenditures, technology adoption, and innovation. In some cases, a CDP aims at 
improving these variables.  
 
2.2.2. Export-related Indicators 
The main link between international trade and productivity is the increase in competition caused 
by trade liberalization (see, for example, Pavcnik [2002], who researched the effect of trade 
liberalization on the productivity of Chilean plants). Van Biesenbroek (2005) also undertook a 
study on trade liberalization to see whether export helped African businesses to achieve higher 
                                                      
11 If the production function is Cobb-Douglas, this expression can also be used to obtain level of TFP.  
12 In some cases, cost shares are averaged by industry or across time. 
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productivity levels. He considered other avenues that could lead to an increase in the 
productivity of the companies engaged in export activities; in particular, he discovered that 
economies of scale are an important conduit for expanding productivity, but credit constraint and 
contract enforcement problems prevented firms that produced for the local market from fully 
exploiting opportunities in economies of scale. 
With regard to policy evaluation, Das et al. (2007) have developed a dynamic model of 
export supply, which embodies plant-level heterogeneity in export profits, uncertainty about the 
determinants of future profits, and market entry costs for new exporters. They applied the model 
to factory-level panel data relating to three Colombian manufacturing industries, and found that 
export revenue subsidies are more effective at stimulating exports than the policies that subsidize 
entry costs. More recently, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), based on Melitz (2003), developed a 
monopolistically competitive model of trade with heterogeneous firms that is well suited to 
analyze trade policies. 
There are several indicators that can be used to measure the effect of a CDP on exports, 
such as the value of exports, probability of becoming an exporter, number of goods exported, and 
number of export markets. Some evaluations of productive development policies have been 
made, using some of these indicators in Latin America. Adopting a firm-level dataset for Peru 
from 2001 to 2005, Volpe and Carballo (2008) found that export promotion activities can be 
associated with increased exports, both in terms of market and product. In Argentina, using firm-
level data from 1996 to 2008, Castillo et al. (2013a) showed that participation in the PRE small- 
and medium-sized enterprise (SME) support program implemented in this country increased the 
firms’ probability of becoming an exporter. 
 
2.2.3. Innovation-related Indicators 
Following Crepon et al. (1998), a distinction can be made between innovation-input (short-term) 
indicators, innovation-output (medium-term) indicators, and economic-performance (long-term) 
indicators. Innovation-input indicators are those more directly affected by intervention. As an 
example, in the case of an R&D subsidies program for small firms, an innovation-input indicator 
relates to total expenditures in R&D. Innovation outputs are variables, where a realization of an 
innovation can be observed, such as patents. In some cases, a firm is directly asked whether it 
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has significantly changed its products, whether a new one has been introduced, or whether there 
has been a change in the production process.  
There have been previous studies evaluating innovation and technology policies in Latin 
America, including Hall and Maffioli (2008), which summarized the appraisals of government 
Technology Development Funds (TDF) in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Panama. These 
appraisals were done at the firm level, using data from innovation and industrial surveys and the 
administrative records of the grantees. They were done in tandem with quasi-experimental 
econometric techniques to minimize the effects of any selection bias. TDF effectiveness depends 
on the financing mechanism used, presence of non-financial constraints, company-university 
interaction, and characteristics of the target beneficiaries. Four levels of potential impact were 
considered: R&D input additionality, behavioral additionality, increases in innovative output, 
and improvement in performance. The evidence suggests that TDF do not crowd out private 
investment, and that they positively affect R&D intensity. In addition, participation in TDF 
induces a more proactive attitude of beneficiary firms towards innovation activities. However, 
the analysis finds little statistically significant impact on patents or new product sales. Other 
studies for Latin American countries include Crespi et al. (2001); Chudnovsky et al. (2006); 
Benavente et al. (2007); Crespi et al. (2010); Alvarez et al. (2012); and Castillo et al. (2013b). 
 
2.2.4. Employment-related Indicators 
A fourth set of indicators is that related to employment. These indicators may include the number 
of employees, type of employees by level of qualification, or the wage employees are paid by the 
firms. For example, Castillo et al. (2013a) found that the PRE SME support program in 
Argentina increased both employment and wages. 
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3. Data 
There is one principle that relates to any empirical analysis, which is the GIGO principle; simply 
put, Garbage In, Garbage Out. No matter how sophisticated the analysis, if the data is no good, 
the result cannot be good. This section provides the guidelines relating to the type of data that is 
required for the SNA application and the evaluation of a CDP. 
One of the challenges met during the evaluation of CDPs in the Latin American and 
Caribbean region was that secondary data (collected for purposes other than for the appraisal of a 
particular program) were not available. Although meaningful surveys and statistics existed from 
which data could have been extrapolated for the monitoring and evaluation of cluster programs, 
they were not always readily available. When census information about the firms in a given 
context is not available, identifying a sample for primary data collection also becomes a 
challenge.  
The section below will be divided into two parts, one relating to the advantages and 
disadvantages of secondary data and the other to providing guidelines for collecting primary 
data. In the latter case, separate discussions will be included relating to sampling for SNA 
analysis and sampling for impact evaluation. 
3.1. Secondary Data  
There are three sources of secondary data: surveys, censuses, and administrative records. Each 
one of these sources has advantages and disadvantages that need to be evaluated. Surveys have 
the advantage of being able to construct a panel of firms with annual information, which is 
essential when applying quasi-experimental techniques that allow control for selection in non-
observables. Surveys also provide information on several variables that allows the evaluator to 
use matching techniques to find non-beneficiaries with similar characteristics to the 
beneficiaries. As mentioned above, this is important because the more information the dataset 
has, the more similar the firms in the control group will be.  
The main limitation of surveys, however, is that they collect information on a sample of 
the population and, in many cases they include only a small proportion of beneficiaries. This 
limitation is particularly meaningful when appraising CDPs, given that it may be likely that 
several beneficiaries will not be included in the survey. In addition, given that CDPs are at the 
industry and regional level, and surveys usually represent the national level, the data on only a 
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small proportion of firms within a particular industry and region may be collected. Another 
possible drawback in the use of surveys is that most of them cover the manufacturing sector and 
only a few include other sectors.  
Censuses, on the other hand, collect information about the universe of firms in a country. 
If beneficiaries happen to be active during a census, they will be included in it. Furthermore, a 
census usually contains more information than in a survey, which is essential when applying the 
propensity score-matching model. The drawback, however, is that they may take place every 10 
years, or various years, before or after policy implementation, rather than every year. This can be 
one of many factors that could affect an appraisal of a program’s impact. Even if the difference-
in-difference estimate is applied, the length of time from one observation to another would make 
it difficult to prove that the program impact can, indeed, be identified. To add to this, while 
businesses should have remained active within the10-year period between the census taking, it is 
likely that smaller firms, related to CPDs, have been in business for less. Box 4 describes some 
of the datasets that have been used in the evaluation of productive development policies (PDP). 
These include Brazil’s annual industrial survey (Pesquisa Industrial Annual, or PIA), (Encuesta 
Industrial Annual, EIA) in Chile, Colombia’s manufacturing survey (Encuesta Annual 
Manufacturera, or EAM), and the innovation surveys of Argentina, Chile, and Panama.  
The third type of secondary data comes from administrative records. There is a wide 
range of institutions collecting useful information about firms for different purposes. Compared 
to surveys and censuses, the main advantage of the administrative datasets is that, in most cases, 
they provide annual information for an entire group of firms. The main drawback, however, is 
that they provide little information about the firms, themselves. As with censuses and surveys, 
they can only be accessed within the relevant institution under a confidentiality agreement. 
Datasets obtained in previous evaluations of productive development policies are the Base for 
the Study of Employment Dynamics (Base para el Estudio de la Dinámica del Empleo, or 
BADE) in Argentina, the annual social information report (Relaçao Anual de Informaçoes 
Sociais, or RAIS) in Brazil, and the Internal Revenue Service (Servicio de Impuestos Internos, or 
SII) in Chile (see, Box 5). 
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The datasets mentioned above do not include network data, given that they are very 
scarce. It is less common to find network data at the regional or cluster level in developing 
countries, although it is sometimes possible to locate information regarding firms through patent 
office databases (such as the United States Patent and Trademark Office [USPTO] or co-
publication databases (such as the Thomas Reuters Web of Knowledge, formerly known as the 
ISI Web of Knowledge), as well as other company information and business intelligence 
databases (such as Bureau van Dijk). Most of these databases, however, capture only formal 
Box 4: Surveys Used in the Evaluation of CDPs 
Pesquisa Industrial Anual (PIA) is an annual survey sampling conducted by Brazil’s census bureau 
(Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatística [IBGE]) that relates to formally established Brazilian 
mining and manufacturing firms and their plants. The sample of firms in PIA is drawn from two strata: a 
non-randomized sample of all Brazilian mining and manufacturing firms with a labor force of 30 or more 
workers and employees and a random sample of small to medium-sized firms with a labor force of five 
to 29 workers and employees. A firm is eligible to be sampled in PIA only if at least half of its revenues 
stem from manufacturing, and if it is formally registered as a taxpayer with the Brazilian tax authorities. 
The methodology was changed in 1996 and 2006. The major change was in 1996, and includes changes 
in both the sampling scheme and in the information collected from the sampled firms. The change in 
2006 was not as important because it was limited to include firms that employ less than five workers in 
the sampling scheme. The 2004 PIA sample covers 42,371 firms among 155,656 eligible ones. PIA 
contains three main groups of variables: (a) information about longitudinal relations across firms; (b) 
balance sheet and income statement information; and (c) economic information beyond the balance sheet 
and income statement. The main longitudinal information in group (a) is the taxpayer firm registry 
number (CNPJ code). This allows for linking observations longitudinally, as well as combining them 
with other sources, such as the Annual Social Information tool (Relação Anual de Informações Sociais 
[RAIS]). Among other variables in group (a) are the ones that indicate the state of activity of a firm in a 
given year (such as whether it operates all year, only part of the year, or exits) and its structural changes 
(such as whether it emerges from a pre-existing firm or whether it creates a spin-off firm). Variables in 
group (b) include cost, revenue, and profit information, detailed in a manner similar to a typical Brazilian 
income statement. On the revenue side, for example, it is possible to exempt non-operational revenues, 
while on the cost side it is feasible to identify intermediate inputs, among other details. Variables in 
group (c) go beyond the income statement and include data, such as investment flows by type of asset 
and numbers of workers and employees. Employment is broken down into production and non-
production workers. 
EAM data, in Colombia, are collected and managed by the National Administrative Department of 
Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística [DANE]). EAM is a census of all 
manufacturing plants with 10 or more employees, or output exceeding COL$500 minimum in wages, 
and is available from 1977 to 2007. This survey contains information on plant characteristics and 
performance variables, such as location, sector of activity, legal organization status, plant size, sales, 
employment, investment, and expenditures. An important characteristic of this survey is that it is 
possible to construct firm-level price indices (see, for example, Eslava et al. [2004)]. This dataset has 
been used by Crespi et al. (2010) to evaluate innovation support programs and Arráiz et al. (2012) to 
evaluate a partial credit guarantee program. Other surveys that have been used in the evaluation of PDPs 
are the Innovation Surveys, collected in several countries in Latin America. 
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connections between firms and/or other organizations and are, therefore, not likely to showcase 
informal linkages, which are essential in a regional cluster’s network structure. Other secondary 
sources of network linkages may exist at the local level for evaluators to explore.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Primary Data 
In the absence of secondary data, primary data should be collected, which requires the use of a 
specially tailored questionnaire. This can prove expensive, and tends to cover only a short 
period, unless systematic data collections are made on the same sample or population over time. 
With firms, historical accounting data may be available, although it may not be very indicative, 
since some of the information may not have been recorded, nor do all firms have proper 
accounting systems. The latter is particularly relevant to micro and small firms.  
Several decisions require consideration prior to collecting primary data, especially with 
regard to the sample design, which is one of the most important steps in every study. These are 
Box 5: Administrative Records in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile That Have Been Used in 
the Impact Evaluation of Productive Development Policies 
 
In Argentina, a dataset called BADE, constructed and managed by the Center for Employment and 
Business Dynamics (Observatorio de Empleo y Dinámica empresarial	  [OEDE]) at the Ministry of Labor, 
Employment, and Social Security, includes data from the administrative records of several public 
institutions, including the National Administration of Social Security (Administración Nacional de 
Seguro Social [ANSES]), Federal Administration of Taxes (Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos 
[AFIP]), and National Customs Administration (Dirección General de Aduanas). BADE is a matched 
employer-employee longitudinal dataset that contains annual information for all the firms disclosing 
employment information in Argentina after 1996. It covers the primary, manufacturing, and service 
sectors, and has firm-level information about age, location, industry, employment, wages, and value of 
exports. In 2008, the dataset included around 6 million workers and 570,000 firms. This dataset was used 
by Castillo et al. (2013a) in the evaluation of the PRE SME support program. 
A similar dataset in Brazil is RAIS. This dataset is maintained by the Brazilian Ministry of 
Employment and Labor (Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego [MTE]). All registered taxpaying 
establishments are requested to submit, annually, information relating to every single worker employed 
by the establishment at any time during a specific year. RAIS is a matched employer-employee 
longitudinal dataset. This dataset contains information relating to industry, region, number of employees, 
wages, workers’ occupations, and education. This dataset was used by De Negri et al (2006) and by 
Maffioli et al. (2011). 
In Chile, there is also a longitudinal dataset covering the population of tax-paying firms. This 
dataset is maintained by Servicio de Impuestos Internos (SII) and contains information about industry, 
region, number of employees, sales, and taxes paid by the firms. This dataset was used in Arráiz et al. 
(2011) for the evaluation of the Supplier Development Program, PDP. 
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(a) unit of analysis and means of identification; (b) representative sample and size of sample; and 
(c) data collection process. 
3.2.1. Unit of Analysis and Means of Identification 
The most likely unit of analysis (UA) to be used for the impact evaluation of a CDP is the firm 
itself.13 While it may appear straightforward, the criteria for firm identification should be 
carefully defined. Although a company is usually a unique unit of production with its own 
identifier (such as a fiscal code number), it may manage various production units (plants) that 
could have characteristics that are irrelevant to the study (for example, one of the plants may be 
outside of the cluster). On the other hand, the study may focus only on firms operating in certain 
industries, which will require criteria to identify the industries (the code relating to the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) of All Economic Activities (Clasificación 
Internacional Industrial Uniforme, or CIIU) and a method to correlate a firm to a specific 
industry.  
3.2.2. Representative Sample and Size of Sample 
Designing a sampling strategy can be relatively complex, and any error at this stage could 
invalidate the entire study. It is essential, therefore, to analyze the following: 
• Sampling frame from which the sample will be drawn. This is highly important, since the 
sampling frame will determine the generalizability (external validity) of the evaluation 
results.  
• Sample size. Other things being equal, the lower the sample size, the less likelihood that 
the assessment will detect any impact, whether it exists or not. This is known as statistical 
power. In general, evaluations that have high statistical power are preferred.  
• Distribution of the sample between treated and control groups. In terms of statistical 
power, the more balanced the groups are, the better it is for the evaluation exercise. 
• Levels at which the intervention is being implemented. In technical terms, these are 
known as “clusters.” 
 
 
                                                      
13 In some cases, studies can be conducted at a more aggregate level, such as a municipality or other administrative 
unit.  
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(i) Sampling based on power calculation for detection of minimal effects 
It is recommended that the sample used be designed by a specialized government agency, such as 
a country’s national statistical office, which normally has access to census data. Such agencies 
also possess first- and second-hand information that could be useful for sample calculations. 
Alternatively, a public or private institution, such as the Chamber of Commerce or a business 
association, would have sufficiently reliable information to enable the identification of the 
population of firms within the cluster. Failing this, particularly in remote rural areas, the most 
accurate information possible should be sought from sources, such as the head of a village or a 
prominent entrepreneur. However, clusters are, by definition, geographically bounded areas, 
which makes it easier to identify the actors that belong to it. 
Once the population of companies is known, the sampling should be carefully done in 
order to guarantee sufficient statistical power to determine a program’s impact and to analyze the 
heterogeneity of impact among producers. Assessing the heterogeneity of impact is common in a 
CDP. Different programs may have varying effects on particular types of producers, so it may be 
in the best interest of the project team to identify and measure these heterogeneous outcomes 
separately. To accomplish this, stratifying the sample to assure representativeness within 
different groups in the population (strata) is advisable. For instance, it may be prudent to obtain 
estimates of the impact by region or by firm size. Stratification assures that the assumptions for 
every one of the subgroups are valid.  
Statisticians tend to rely on the power formula to ensure that there is sufficient statistical 
power to identify program impact. The power formula, which depends on the sampling design, 
usually is composed of four pieces of information: (i) expected effect on outcome variable, (ii) 
outcome variable’s standard deviation, (iii) confidence level (usually 95 percent), and (iv) 
statistical power.  
To reduce sample dispersion and, therefore, administrative costs, it is common practice to 
obtain the sample in two stages. In the first, the principal sampling units (PSU) are randomly 
selected, and in the second, producers within the already selected PSU are randomly chosen. The 
PSUs are already defined geographic areas. However, employing this two-stage process involves 
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correction for intra-cluster correlation, which increases the sample size.14 Intra-cluster correlation 
correction is required, as the production units within the same cluster may be similar.  
Finally, given that most of the data collection procedures for impact evaluations involve 
collecting a baseline and a follow-up survey for the same producers, a non-response/attrition 
adjustment may be needed. The attrition rate refers to the number of production units that cannot 
be interviewed in the follow-up survey because these are not found by the interviewers. The non-
response and attrition correction varies among countries and regions. For example, a greater 
attrition correction could be adequate in a country that has a higher level of migration. 
 
(ii) Sampling for SNA analysis 
If SNA analysis is included in the study, the sampling strategy has some caveats. The collection 
of SNA data does not always follow the same sampling strategies as those used for general data 
collections (see Point (i) above). In fact, if the number of firms is limited and the evaluation 
budget allows for it, an attempt to interview all the actors of the cluster is recommended (Table 3 
(i)). The ability to collect data on the whole population of cluster actors is ideal for undertaking 
both SNA and econometric analyses for an CDP impact study. The SNA tool will enable the 
collection of “full network” data, and the analysis of social structures, and measuring of all 
structural concepts of network analysis discussed earlier (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; 
Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). The collection of full network data is normally carried out by 
interviewing all cluster actors through a “roster recall” method. Whereas interviewing the whole 
population of cluster actors is preferable in order to carry out SNA analysis, it is not essential to 
an econometric analysis of impact evaluation. However, having population data does not hinder 
but, rather, improves the effectiveness of the econometric analysis.  
A second strategy can be applied, when accessing the overall cluster population is not 
feasible and the only option remaining is to draw a population sample. This can be due to either 
the scope of the cluster population being too large or because firms are unwilling to collaborate 
in the survey (Table 3 (ii)). Sampling in SNA analysis does not generally follow the same rules 
applied to standard statistics. This means that, if the objective is to analyze the structure of 
networks into a cluster, random sampling or other standard sampling approaches (e.g., stratified 
sampling) are not generally endorsed. In fact, failure to include a central actor may generate a 
                                                      
14 Note that “cluster,” in this instance, is used in statistical terms.  
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bias into the measuring of the network. Likewise, non-respondents may severely distort data and 
introduce a bias, as a network map may be very misleading if the central actor is not included 
(Borgatti and Molina, 2003). One way to resolve this is to collect full network data about only a 
workable number of firms, which correspond to a sub-set of the cluster population, selected on 
the basis of a specific criterion. For example, it could be restricting the analysis only to firms 
occupying specific stages of the value chain (e.g., only assembly firms), or working in selected 
industries (in the case of several industries being present in the same cluster), or having other 
characteristics that can be distinguished ex-ante. While this is only a second-best approach for 
SNA analysis, it should be taken cautiously when applied to econometric impact evaluation 
studies, as it can introduce a selection bias that needs to be treated carefully. In particular, this 
approach implies that inferences can only be made about the sample of the population that has 
been selected and not about the overall cluster population (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) and, 
hence, their choice should be made considering the CDP evaluation objectives. 
If this latter approach is not compatible with the objective of the impact study, it is 
possible to opt for a third way, in which a sample of focal actors (individuals or organizations, 
called “ego”) are selected, based on the sampling approach discussed earlier (Point (i)), and who 
are interviewed about their direct linkages (Table 3 (iii)). This approach yields considerably less 
information about network structure because it is unable to map the full network, but it is often 
less costly and more practical (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). The collection of data, in this case, 
includes interviewing the sampled focal actors about their linkages, often opting for a free recall 
method (Items 9.2. and 9.3. in Box 9 in Section 3.4.2). If possible, it is recommended to 
interview the focal actors’ direct contacts to obtain full information about the structure of the 
ego-networks (Item 9.4. in Box 9 in Section 3.4.2). Ego-network data are less powerful than 
“full network” data, but can still be used to calculate different indicators of centrality and actor-
level position in the network, such as degree of centrality, closure, and structural holes (Table 1). 
Moreover, if the sample has been drawn randomly, it is possible to explore some structural 
properties of the network by analyzing degree centrality distributions. However, many structural 
measures of the overall network (e.g., core-periphery) cannot be observed, if the network data 
has not been fully collected.  
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Table 3: SNA Sampling Strategies 
Sampling Options SNA Econometric Impact Evaluation Drawbacks 
(i) Full population of cluster 
actors 
Yes Yes (provided that 
information for a control 
group is available). 
High costs. 
Unfeasible for highly populated 
clusters or low-budget 
evaluations. 
(ii) Selection of cluster sub-
population (not random or 
stratified) 
Yes, limited 
to the sub-
population. 
Yes, limited to the sub-
population (provided that 
information for a control 
group is available). 
Analysis and inference is possible 
only on a portion of the cluster 
population, not on the cluster as a 
whole. 
(iii) Standard sampling 
techniques and ego-network 
data collection  
Yes, limited 
to ego-
centered 
analysis. 
Yes (provided that 
information for a control 
group is available). 
It is not possible to measure the 
structural properties of the cluster 
network, but only to analyze the 
size and characteristics of the 
network around each sampled 
actor. 
 
3.2.3.  Data Collection Process 
With regard to the data collection process, the following applies:  
• Information that is collected and how it will be measured. The design of a survey for a 
program’s impact evaluation should be based on the theory of change. Therefore, it should 
be able to generate not only the information needed for computation of the outcome 
indicators (final and intermediate), but also other control variables essential to improve the 
attribution to the effects on the program. In addition to this, the collection of cost data 
should not be neglected, which should be brought about by the monitoring of the systems 
in place, and which will enable ex-post cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis. 
• Number of waves of data collection. For the typical impact evaluation, at least two waves 
of data collection are necessary for both the treatment and control groups: one at baseline 
level (prior to intervention) and one as a follow up (subsequent to intervention). When to 
do the follow-up data collection depends upon several factors, including the period of time 
it will take before an impact can be observed. When there is sufficient data for two or more 
rounds, it is time for the analysis to take place. The more follow-up analyses, the easier it 
will be to measure the medium- and long-term impact of a program. Second, the more 
sequences of follow-up analyses, the more the statistical power of the sample and the 
likelihood of detecting the minor effects will be. 
• Timing of data collection. For most impact evaluations, it is crucial to select the most 
appropriate time to collect the data. For example, in the case of an impact evaluation that 
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aims to identify the effect of a program on agricultural productivity, it would be 
recommended to conduct the survey immediately after the main harvest, in order to reduce 
measurement error and avoid a recall period. Appropriate timing depends on the specific 
substance for which the data is collected. Since CDPs require time to reflect any effects 
(often years), it may be necessary to let some time pass before carrying out an impact 
evaluation. 
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Box 6: Five Steps and Ten Tips for Data Collection 
Gertler et al. (2011) provide a list of five steps that help to organize the data collection process: 
1. Engage the help of an agency that specializes in data collection; that is, the institution that 
implements the program, another government institution, or an independent firm. It is important to 
ensure that no contamination or bias will be introduced by the agency (e.g., in the event that it is 
the agency that conducts the program) and, if baseline data is collected, that no program 
operations have taken place prior to collection.  
2. Commission the development of a questionnaire. It is necessary to collect, selectively and 
consistently, all information required to respond to policy questions, including the intermediate 
and final impact indicators, control variables, exogenous factors, and other characteristics of the 
intervention. 
3. The agency or firm, responsible for collecting data, will recruit and train field staff, and will pilot 
the questionnaire (for comprehension and accuracy) before it is finalized, making any necessary 
adjustments. 
4. The agency or firm will conduct the fieldwork, supervise the team (including technical staff, 
supervisors, field coordinators, support staff, and data entry personnel), and provide training for 
the data collection team. It will provide a manual of practices and procedures. It is crucial, at this 
stage, to attend to any non-sampling errors there may be—in particular, Nonresponse and 
Measurement Errors—so as to avoid any bias in the evaluation. 
5. Compute, process, and validate the data collected. 
 
Stecklov and Weinreb (2010) provide a list of 10 tips that can be taken to reduce measurement error: 
1. Follow basic administrative guidelines. 
2. Confirm the regional and national “key players,” and ensure that consideration is given to ways in 
which to work with them, so as to reduce the chance of “spoilers.” 
3. Conduct a pilot test of all questionnaires. 
4. Engage a relatively large number of potential interviewers for training and set high standards for 
reward, including conducting an examination at the end of the training course. 
5. Interviewers should be assigned using interpenetrating sampling techniques. 
6. Consider all potential errors of non-observation, including sampling, coverage, and non-response. 
7. Include questions that can allow ex-post identification of different types of errors of measurement. 
8. Carefully evaluate whether there are systematic non-response patterns that might affect the 
interpretation of findings. 
9. Design clear guidelines for filling in missing data, preferably using interviewer teams done shortly 
after each day of data collection. 
10. Attempt to compare results to those that might be obtainable from routine statistics or other data 
sources. 
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3.3. Possible Difficulties and Advice when Collecting SNA Data 
As with any data collection, it is important to increase the response rate. This means that when a 
CDP is designed, it already includes the program beneficiaries for the evaluation process. 
Therefore, the evaluation should be prepared in tandem with the policy design so as to ensure 
that the actors participating in, or benefitting from, the CDP will also participate in the 
evaluation process by responding to the survey, both before, during, and after CDP 
implementation.  
Evaluators should be aware that obtaining full network data (Table 3i) may prove to be a 
challenge in terms of non-responsiveness, in which case it is recommended that the policy design 
include the SNA process for an impact assessment. This will ensure that CDP beneficiaries are 
well informed, prior to the start of the program, about the data requirements. It is important that 
as many beneficiaries participate in the survey as possible, excluding the non-beneficiaries.  
 Ethical concerns could arise relating to the collection of network data. Contrary to 
conventional methodological approaches, anonymity at the data collection stage relating to CDPs 
is not possible. The respondents are required to report and provide the names of those within 
their network (Borgatti and Molina, 2003), some of who may not wish to be named, particularly 
in terms of sensitive relationships (e.g., bribes for business licenses; transfer of sensitive 
information about a firm; proposed strategic alliances). These ethical issues should be borne in 
mind. To overcome them, respondents need to be assured that all relationship information will be 
maintained in confidence, and that network maps will not include the names of the actors, unless 
previously agreed with the respondents. In parallel, relationship questions should be formed so as 
to ensure that responses do not expose sensitive or highly strategic information. Borgatti and 
Molina (2005) provide an example each of a disclosure agreement and a consent form, which can 
be tailored to CDP evaluation surveys to avoid any misunderstandings relating to the collection 
and use of network data.  
3.4. Other Issues Related to Data Collection 
3.4.1.  Pilot Testing and Survey Preparation 
 
Before administering a baseline and follow-up survey, the norm is that the data collection 
strategy should include a pilot survey, so as to ensure the validity of the questionnaire. This can 
expose questions or words that could be misinterpreted or misread, and will confirm the 
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relevance of the questionnaire. Questionnaires often include such tools as checklists for cross-
referencing for quality assurance. The quality assurance can be confirmed at the time when the 
questions are checked. 
The number of pilots depends significantly on the resources available to finance the data 
collection. Nevertheless, at least two pilot surveys should be undertaken prior to implementation 
of the baseline and before every follow-up survey. The size of the pilot may vary from project to 
project, depending on the sample size of the survey, which, in turn, depends on the survey 
stratification. The test also serves to identify the logistics required to carry out the survey. Since 
it will mirror the data collection process in the field, it can indicate how best to organize both the 
data collection and the data input. In general, the sooner the data input follows data collection, 
any errors identified in the output of data can be resolved in the field. Conducting a survey 
generally includes a team of approximately five people; one is assigned as a task leader, 
responsible for the input of data in the field, while the rest are analysts. Any errors that may be 
found in the data output can be addressed immediately by sending the analysts back to the field.  
Every group of interviewers should be familiar with the area(s) in which their 
questionnaires will be circulated, as well as which routes to take. Each team member should 
possess a data collection schedule, outlining the process in its entirety, as well as for that 
pertaining to each group. Prior to any type of fieldwork, it is essential that the interviewers, as 
well as the supervisors, have received adequate training, either together during the pilot stage or 
separately. Training is essential so that the interviewers become familiar with the survey process, 
and it should include theoretical, as well as practical, exercises in the field with other 
interviewers and firm owners. The training period depends on the length and difficulty of the 
questionnaire, and should include supervision in the field, as well as during the administration 
process. Finally, the procedure for data collection should include a timeline of activities for all 
those involved in the process. Box 7 provides an example of an impact evaluation timeline. 
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Box 7: Impact Evaluation Timeline: An Example 
The timeline illustrated below describes the main activities, the actors involved, and the dates on 
which the activities will be conducted for the Farmers’ Direct Support Program (Programa de Apoyos 
Directos al Campo (PROCAMPO)) impact evaluation in Mexico. Overall, three main actors are 
responsible for relevant activities are the IDB (through its Strategy Development, ,Rural 
Development, and Environment and Natural Disasters divisions), a technical assistance (TA) firm, 
responsible for the field work, and the National Statistics and Geography Institute of Mexico (Instituto 
National de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI)) that will provide the sampling methodology, based on 
the 2007 Agricultural Census. 
Activities Responsibility Dates 
 Baseline administration 
Questionnaire design IDB Nov. 2009–Apr. 
2010 
Pilot (1st round) TA Firm Sept.–Oct. 2010 
Pilot (2nd round) TA Firm Oct.–Nov. 2010 
Sampling design and methodology INEGI June–Aug. 2010 
Training for interviewers and 
supervisors; preparation of materials for 
survey administration. 
TA Firm Nov.–Jan. 2011 
Baseline administration TA Firm Feb.–Mar. 2011 
Data input TA Firm Apr.–May 2011 
Baseline data  TA Firm May 2011 
Baseline analysis IDB June–Sept.2011 
Follow-up Survey 
Questionnaire design IDB Nov. 2011–Apr. 
2012 
Pilot (1st round) TA Firm June 2012–July 
2012 
Pilot (2nd round) TA Firm Aug.–Sept..2012 
Training for interviewers and 
supervisors; preparation of materials for 
survey administration. 
TA Firm Oct. 2012–Jan. 
2013 
Follow-up survey administration TA Firm Feb–March 2013 
Data Entry Consultant Firm April–May 2013 
Follow-up Data Consultant Firm May 2013 
Impact Evaluation Analysis  IDB June–Sept. 2013 
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3.4.2. The Questionnaire 
In order to compile information that is relevant to the analysis, we recommend a properly 
structured questionnaire that includes information on, at least, the following:  
1. Respondent firm’s (or other actor’s) key characteristics (location, year established, 
mergers and acquisitions [if any]; size, sector, main local activities, etc., examples of 
which are illustrated in Box 8). 
2. Respondent firm’s (or other actor’s) participation in the CDP (date it became part of the 
initiative, types of new activities undertaken, perceived benefits from participation, year 
in which participation is estimated to end). 
3. Respondent firm’s (or other actor’s) key performance indicators.  
4. Formation of, and participation in, local networks. The nature and characteristics of 
networks and their linkages will depend on the local context and will, thus, have to be 
determined after an initial evaluation, and then validated in the field during the pilot.  
 
 
 
 The questionnaire should include a section relating specifically to network data, with 
questions related to actors’ relationships with other actors and requesting specific names. This 
contrasts with other approaches, where questions relate to the relationship between the 
respondent and various categories or groups of actors (e.g., suppliers, clients, universities). 
Depending on the sampling strategy (Table 3), it is possible to opt for different relational data 
collection methods.  
Box 8: Examples of Relevant Questions 
1. Identification number. 
2. Principal product. 
3. Size (mall, medium, or large) 
4. Year operations began. 
5. Total annual sales in any given year. 
6. Percentage of sales in any given year (national sales, indirect exports, direct exports). 
7. Total annual cost of raw materials, materials inputs, or supplies in any given year. 
8. Introduction (if any) of new or significantly improved products or processes for producing or 
supplying merchandise or services. 
9. Lines of credit or loans from financial institutions. 
10. Number of permanent, full-time employees/workers at the end of any given year. 
11. Total annual cost of labor, including wages, salaries, bonuses, and social security in any given year. 
12. Net book value of machinery, vehicles, and equipment in any given year. 
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 In the case of a sampling design for interviewing an entire population of cluster actors 
(Table 3i), the “roster recall” method is suggested, where the questionnaire includes a complete 
list (roster) of the cluster actors. It also should seek the existence or importance of a given type 
of relationship between the interviewee (focal actor) and the rest of actors listed in the roster. 
The questions can be formed for collecting either dichotomous relational data (existence/non-
existence of a link) or valued data, which weight relationships on the basis of their importance, 
frequency, size, value, etcetera. Relationships can also be mutual by design (e.g., a question 
about the geographical distance between two actors) or un-directional (e.g., relationships where 
an asset is transferred from actor i to actor j). Item 9.1 in Box 9 illustrates examples of questions, 
based on the roster recall method.  
 The collection of these types of relational data can be undertaken face to face or through 
other means, such as online questionnaires, depending on the nature and characteristics of the 
interviewees. For rural farmers, face-to-face interviews are a more appropriate tool, while ICT 
managers may be willing and sufficiently capable to respond to an online survey. The roster 
recall method is the most efficient and recommended way to collect network data relating to an 
entire population of cluster firms. It minimizes the risk of data loss due to lapses of memory by a 
respondent, given that each interviewee is supplied with a complete list of other actors within the 
cluster to consult with prior to tackling the relationship question(s). The same method can be 
applied when the sample is represented by a sub-population of cluster actors (Table 3ii), with the 
caveat that, in this case, the roster includes only the actors of the sub-population.  
 When these sampling options are not available, and the focal firms are selected using 
ordinary statistics sampling techniques (Table 3 (iii)), respondents should be questioned about 
their relationships with the rest of the cluster population. If these are too numerous to be included 
in a roster, or are unknown prior to data collection, the “free recall” method is recommended. 
The respondent will be free to name cluster actors with this method, without drawing from a 
predetermined list, and the questions can be developed within a “free choice” or “fixed choice” 
design. In the free choice design, respondents have no constraint on how many names to provide, 
which has the advantage of including all links, regardless of relevance, although it runs the risk 
of producing incorrect responses (Item 9.2 in Box 9). In the fixed choice design (Item 9.3. in Box 
9), respondents are requested to provide a maximum number of names to ensure they will 
produce the most important actors in the network, instead of the less relevant ones. To improve 
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the accuracy of ego-centered networks in both cases, it is suggested that relationship data be 
compiled to determine whether the actors linked to the ego-network are connected to each other. 
One way to do this is to first interview the ego, and then use a snowball approach to interview 
the alters about their relationships. Alternatively, the ego can be questioned in such a way as to 
report the existence of linkages among the alters (Item 9.4. in Box 9).  
 
Box 9. Examples of Relational Questions 
 
9.1. Roster-Recall  
Seeking or giving technical advice (TA) 
• If TA is urgently required, which local companies included in the roster do you select for their expertise? [Please rate the 
importance attached to the knowledge linkage, established with each of the firms, according to its expertise and quality, on 
the basis of the following scale: 0=none; 1=low; 2=medium; 3=high.] 
•  
• Which of the firms in the roster do you think have benefited from the technical support provided by this company?[Please 
rate the importance attached to the knowledge linkage, established with each of the firms according to its expertise and 
quality, on the basis of the following scale: 0=none; 1=low; 2=medium; 3=high.] 
 
Collaboration in marketing  
• Indicate the firms in the roster with which this company has collaborated in developing a joint marketing initiative within 
the past two years. [Please rate the importance attached to the collaboration, according to the impact it had on your business 
activities, based on the following scale: 0=none; 1=low; 2= medium; 3=high.] 
 
Collaboration as a result of the CDP  
• Indicate the firms in the roster with which this company has collaborated in developing a new product for the domestic 
market as a direct consequence of the policy initiative [specify which]. [Please rate the frequency of collaboration, 
according to the following scale: 0=none; 1= a few times a year; 2=monthly; 3=weekly.] 
 
9.2. Free-Recall (Fixed Choice) 
Contribution to product upgrading  
• Name up to five local farmers whom you consider to have contributed to the upgrade in the quality of your crops.  
 
University-industry linkages 
• Indicate the name of up to ten university researchers with which you have interacted on at least one of the activities, listed 
below, within the past five years:  
•  
• Joint research agreements (research undertaken by both parties)  
• Consultancy work (commissioned by industry; not involving original research)  
• Informal contacts (TA not based on a market transaction)  
• Attendance at conferences with industry and university participation 
• Other (specify_____________________). 
 
Innovative links as a consequence of the CDP 
• Name up to five public research institutions with which this firm has established innovative links as a consequence of the 
CDP [normally a precise definition of “innovative link” is provided.]. 
 
9.3 Free-Recall (Free Choice) 
Whom you trust (free choice) 
• Name the entrepreneurs operating within the local cluster that you trust most [normally a precise definition of “trust” is 
provided]. 
 
Whom you trust (name generators) 
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• Name the local entrepreneurs to whom you would lend a piece of machinery for free.  
• Name the local entrepreneurs to whom you would lend money.  
• Name the local entrepreneurs whom you would inform first about a new market opportunity.  
 
Whom you trust more after the CDP (free choice) 
• Name the entrepreneurs operating within the local cluster, whom you trust more as a consequence of the cluster policy 
initiative [specify which] + [normally a precise definition of “trust” is provided]. 
 
9.4. Ego-Network 
Question to the ‘ego’ 
• Name the firms within the cluster with which this company has collaborated for the solution of local environmental 
problems within the past three years. 
 
Question to the ‘alters’ (only about ego’s alters – included in a roster) 
• Indicate the firms in the roster with which this company has collaborated for the solution of local environmental problems 
within the past three years.  
 
Box 10. SNA Methodologies Applied to CDP Impact Evaluation:  
The Córdoba Electronics Industry in Argentina 
 
A CDP in the electronics industry of Córdoba was undertaken between 2003 and 2007, and was part of a wider set of 
CDPs, called Productivity Integration Programs (Programas de Integración Productiva, or PIP), co-funded by the 
Multilateral Investment Fund (Fondo Multilateral de Inversiones, or FOMIN), the IDB, and local resources. Some of the 
key objectives of the Córdoba CDP were to strengthen local linkages and cooperation among the private actors and 
between private actors and local institutions; ease local firms’ access to new production technology and organizational 
innovations; and promote access to new markets.  
SNA analysis was used for determining (1) the evolution of the inter-organizational networks within the cluster; 
(2) the benefits of the CDP, with particular reference to the changes that took place within the inter-organizational 
networks; and (3) whether these changes positively impacted the performance of firms. The study relied on two waves of 
data, collected in 2005 and 2012, respectively, drawn from direct interviews with local entrepreneurs and managers. A 
focus group was also part of the evaluation study.  
The study analyzed the characteristics of two types of local inter-organizational networks: the information 
network (IN), formed to transfer business information, and the collaboration network (CN), based on projects with joint 
collaboration. The specifics of these networks were initially analyzed by means of descriptive SNA, which successfully 
measured the network structure and identified the central firms within the network, defined as the dominant players. These 
central enterprises appeared to be sufficiently important to ensure network connectivity and create the link between treated 
and untreated firms. Subsequently, by comparing the principal structural measures of the 2005 network and the 2012 
network, it was discovered that they became, over time, less dense and more hierarchical, which was consistent with the 
fact that local firms tend to plan their linkages, learn how to “economize” on the number of relationships they can form, 
and select only partners from which they believe they can obtain tangible benefits. The study also found a relatively stable 
pattern of interaction over time, represented by the consolidation of a critical mass of firms—mainly the dominant players 
and their direct contacts—which are conclusive in maintaining the local inter-organizational network active.  
Descriptive SNA analysis was also employed to demonstrate that the CDP had, indeed, led to the strengthening 
and creation of new technology-transfer ties between the electronics firms in Córdoba and other local/provincial or 
national institutions (among which are local universities). However, it showed no impact on the promotion of new linkages 
related to the promotion of export-oriented activities.  
Finally, a SAOM analysis was applied on the network changes to identify what factors contributed to the 
formation of new links between 2005 and 2012. The investigation found that firms that had more intensively participated 
in some of the activities promoted by the CDP, were more likely to form new information links over the period 2005-12. 
To differentiate, the activities that promoted new information ties were those that were concrete, such as participating in 
the local community center for supplies and supplier development (Centro de Abastecimientos Comunitarios y Desarrollo 
de Proveedores (CACyDP) and strategic planning workshops. Those that were designed to promote networking (i.e., the 
Affinity Group Workshops and other institutional activities) failed to do so. Due to data limitations, the study was unable 
to demonstrate a robust relationship between the CDP, network participation, and firm-level performance. More details on 
this case are available in Giuliani and Matta (2013).  
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4. Determining Causality: The Attribution Problem 
4.1. The Attribution Problem 
To assess the impact of a CDP, a causal relationship between the policy treatment and the 
selected outcome variable(s) needs to be identified. The causal effect of a policy is the difference 
between the value of the outcome variable, after the policy has been applied, and the value of the 
outcome variable in the absence of the policy. Suppose the policy variable takes value one when 
firm i participates to CDP and zero otherwise – i.e. Ci = {0,1}. Suppose in addition that if firm i 
participates in a CDP (Ci=1), the value of the outcome variable would be Yi1; if it does not 
participate (Ci=0), the value of the outcome variable is Yi0. In technical terms, Yi1 and Yi0 are 
known as potential outcomes. Thus, the outcome variable of firm i can be written as: 
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or  
      Yi = Yi0 + (Yi1-Yi0) Ci.      
The only difference between the two scenarios is that in one, the firm participates in the 
program, and in the other, it does not. Therefore, the difference in the outcome variables, Yi1 – 
Yi0, can be attributed to the policy. The difference between the potential outcomes is the causal 
effect of policy C on the outcome variable Y, and the objective of an impact evaluation is to 
measure it.  
It is important to note that only one of these potential outcomes is observed. If firm i 
participates in the CDP, Yi1 is observed and, if it does not, Yi0 is observed. Therefore, to estimate 
Yi1 – Yi0 for participants, the counterfactual, Yi0, needs to be estimated. This is the first and most 
difficult challenge to be addressed.15 A second challenge that needs to be addressed during any 
evaluation is the fact that it is impossible to estimate the effect of C on Y for each individual i 
and therefore we estimate the average effect of the policy instead of the individual effect. The 
rest of the section aims at solving the first challenge; that is, the estimation of the counterfactual. 
The first solution that usually comes to mind is to estimate the counterfactual by using 
the firms that do not participate in the program. However, is the information of the non-
participants a good estimate of the counterfactual? Or, in other words, if participants had not 
                                                      
15 This has been called The Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference (Holland 1986). 
51 
 
participated, would their outcome be the same as the outcome of non-participants? There are 
several reasons to think that the answer is negative. For example, imagine a situation in which 
we want to know if a CDP was effective in increasing firms’ productivity by comparing the 
productivity of participants and non-participants after the program is applied. Even if we find 
that the productivity of participants is higher than the productivity of non-participants, that 
difference cannot be attributed to the program. In fact, if the participants had been already more 
productive than the non-participants prior to implementation of the program, the difference after 
the program would reflect the difference before the program and not only the effect of the 
program. Unfortunately, this is not an extreme example with little empirical relevance; it is 
generally the rule. Firms that decide to participate in a CDP are more likely to be motivated, 
entrepreneurial, and are better managed than those that do not participate. In the evaluation 
literature this is known as selection bias.  
The second solution that usually comes to mind is to estimate the counterfactual using the 
information of participants prior to implementation of the program. This method is known as the 
before-after comparison.  
Worth mentioning is that the before-after comparison may prove effective when 
appraising the first phase of a CDP. One can reasonably argue that the level of articulation before 
the design and implementation of a CDP could be considered an appropriate counterfactual of 
articulation at the end of a CDP. In this case, a simple comparison of the social network 
indicators that measure articulation before and after a CDP takes place can give use the average 
effect of the program: 
ATET= E(Yit|Xi) – E(Yit-1|Xi) 
where Yi is a network indicator for agent i, and Xi are observable characteristics of the agents.  
Reliability depends on whether the other factors affecting changes in articulation levels can be 
considered negligible, or whether they can be attributed to the preparation phase of a CDP. Thus, 
in the short run, a before-after approach is likely to be appropriate for attribution purposes. If the 
before-after comparisons are applied after several years, it will be likely that other things may 
have changed sufficiently as to affect articulation. 
A third challenge in the evaluation of CDP is the presence of spillovers. This challenge is 
particularly important in this type of policy because it aims at promoting spillovers. To include 
spillovers in the evaluation of CDP it is necessary to recognize that there are two types of 
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beneficiaries and, therefore, two causal relationships of interest. On the one hand, direct 
beneficiaries are those firms that participate in the cluster program; that is, they accept to actively 
participate in the cluster development plan. On the other hand, indirect beneficiaries are those 
firms that do not participate in the program, but have links to participants—for example, they are 
located in the same municipality. 
4.2. Randomized Experiment 
Like in other type of policies, the ideal experiment that would answer the causal effect questions 
is a randomized assignment of the cluster policy.16 17 Even when it is not possible to randomize 
treatment, it is always recommendable (and feasible) to imagine which would be the experiment 
that would answer the questions of interest. In the case of CDP, the randomization has to be done 
at two different levels (double randomization) in order to select the locations where the cluster 
program should be applied and the firms in the selected locations that would receive the policy.18 
Once the program has been randomly assigned, two comparisons can be done to evaluate 
the effect of the program. The first comparison provides the direct impact of the program by 
comparing direct beneficiaries (CDP firms) and similar non-beneficiaries: 
DATE = E[Yi|Di=1,Ci=1] – E[Yi|Di=0,Ci=0] 
                                                      
16 With a large enough number of observations, the randomized assignment of the policy ensures that beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries have statistically equivalent averages not only for their observed characteristics but also for 
their unobserved characteristics before the policy is applied. 
17 Alternatively, the effectiveness of CDPs can also be evaluated using a structural model. A structural model is a 
collection of stylized mathematical descriptions of behavior and environment that are combined to produce 
predictions about the way economic agents would behave in different scenarios. Structural models are constructed 
and used in the following way. First, the evaluator defines the equations describing the behavior of relevant agents—
for example, consumers that select goods to maximize their utility for a given budget or firms that maximize profits 
using their production function. These equations are function of the policy parameters; for example, budget 
constraints are function of taxes and profits are function of subsidies that firms might receive. Second, these 
equations are combined to define the market equilibrium. Given that behavioral equations depend on policy 
parameters, the equilibrium also depends of policy parameters. Finally, the model is used to predict changes in the 
equilibrium derived from changes in policy. It is worth noting that in structural models the counterfactual is 
constructed from the underlying theoretical model, and thus can be used for ex-ante evaluation because it does not 
require post treatment data. These models can also be used to evaluate programs when counterfactual outcomes 
cannot be constructed empirically (Di Nardo and Lee 2010). It is important to mention that these models need to be 
validated. By construction they are good to make predictions in the scenario they were constructed. However, the 
interest is in doing predictions in different scenarios and therefore they need to be tested for predictions in other 
scenarios.  
18 In this toolkit, we focus in geographic spillovers because it is the most common source of spillovers in cluster 
programs. However, there are other sources of spillovers. Castillo et al. (2013b) presents the results of an impact 
evaluation of an innovation program in Argentina, using labor mobility as the source of spillovers. 
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where Ci takes value 1 if the firm participates within the cluster policy , or 0 otherwise; and Di 
takes value 1 if the location is a treated location, or 0 otherwise, and DATE is the Direct Average 
Treatment Effect (the difference between the average value of the outcome variable for direct 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The second comparison is between the indirect beneficiaries 
and similar non-beneficiaries, which will identify the Indirect Average Treatment Effect: 
IATE = E[Yi|Di=1,Ci=0] – E[Yi|Di=0,Ci=0] 
For the evaluation purpose, as described above, a random assignment of treated 
municipalities and the cluster policy (double randomization) is the best way to proceed. 
However, in practice, most cluster policies are not designed using a randomized control trial and, 
thus, non-experimental methods should be applied. 
4.3. Non-Experimental Methods 
The procedure to identify the impact of a CDP without random assignment of the policy is the 
same as in the case of random assignment; that is, to compare direct and indirect beneficiaries 
with non-beneficiaries. However, in this case, the simple comparison of averages gives biased 
results because of the selection problem mentioned above and econometric techniques are 
needed. The impact evaluation literature provides us with a set of methods that can be used to 
reduce and ideally eliminate the selection bias. 
This section includes a brief discussion on each of the non-experimental econometric 
methods that can be used relating to the performance of firms in the impact evaluation of a CDP: 
1. Propensity Score Matching 
2. Difference-in-Differences 
3. Instrumental Variables 
4. Regression Discontinuity 
4.3.1. Propensity Score Matching  
As we mentioned above, the selection problem appears because beneficiaries (direct and 
indirect) are different than non-beneficiaries even before the policy is applied. The propensity 
score matching method defines a control group –non-beneficiaries similar to beneficiaries—
using information on observable characteristics of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The 
procedure involves two steps: first, estimating the probability of participating in the program— 
that is, estimating the “propensity score”—and second, comparing beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries with similar probability of participating in the program –finding non-beneficiaries 
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with similar probability of participating in the program is “matching on the propensity score.” 
The main idea of the method is that by matching firms using the propensity score, the observable 
characteristics used to estimate that probability will be balanced between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
The assumption necessary for identifying the effect of the policy using this method is that 
there is a set of covariates, observable to the evaluator, such that after controlling for these 
covariates, the potential outcomes are independent of the treatment status (receive or not receive 
the program). This assumption is known as Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), 
Unconfoundedness or Selection-on-observables. It means that after controlling for the covariates 
(observable characteristics), for the evaluation, the treatment is as good as random. 
The evaluator needs to take several decisions when applying the propensity score 
matching procedure. It is necessary to choose the probability model used to estimate the 
propensity score. This involves the model and the variables included in the model. Then it is 
necessary to define the matching algorithm. Next, depending on the matching algorithm, it is 
necessary to define other parameters. For example, in the case of nearest neighbor matching it is 
necessary to define if the procedure is with replacement or not and how many neighbors to 
consider. For a complete discussion on the technical decisions that have to be taken see Heinrich 
et al. (2010) and the references therein. 
The principal advantage of this method is that it can be applied to a cross-section of 
firms, which is important because, in many cases, there is only information for one period after 
the program has been implemented. The main disadvantage, however, is that the CIA is too 
strong. It indicates that the evaluator observes all the information that drives participation in the 
program. However, this is not generally the case, and therefore it is a meaningful limitation. As 
mentioned previously, it is likely that only the best firms decide to participate in the program. If 
ability or the motivation of the entrepreneur is one of the determinants of firm’s participation, it 
is not possible to control for self-selection using PSM, since the evaluator does not observe 
ability nor motivation. This is a problem that it is always present. Nevertheless, some 
researchers, who use PSM, argue that they can minimize the problem because they have a large 
set of observables that will allow them to control for the selection. As will become clear in the 
following section, however, most of the available datasets in Latin America contain few 
variables. As a result, there are several unobserved (for the evaluator) variables that can explain 
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participation in a program. Therefore, this method cannot control for self-selection and provides 
biased estimates of the effect of CDP. 
 
4.3.2. Difference-in-differences  
As mentioned above, the conditional independence assumption is not met when there are 
unobservable factors driving the selection of firms into the cluster programs. However, if 
pretreatment data are available and the unobservable factors driving selection are time invariant, 
the conditional independence assumption can be relaxed. In this case, the effect of unobservables 
can be cancelled out by taking the difference in outcomes before and after the program. With two 
periods—pre and post treatment—the implementation is similar to matching except that outcome 
is measured in changes; that is, if t and t’ are pre and post treatment and Yi is the original 
outcome, the new outcome variable is ΔYi = Yit’−Yit. 
When more time periods are available the difference-in-difference (DD) estimator is the 
parameter δ in the following regression: 
Yit = δ Cit + γ Xit + µt + ci + vit 
where Yit is the outcome variable and Cit is a dummy variable that takes value 1 after the firm is 
a beneficiary of the program. Note that two equations need to be estimated: one for direct 
beneficiaries and the other for indirect beneficiaries. µt is measuring all the unobserved time-
varying factors that affect all the firms in the same way (in practice, these factors are captured by 
a set of year dummies). ci captures all the unobserved time-invariant firm-specific characteristics 
that affect the decision of participating in the program or affect the value of the outcome 
variables.  
This method is better than PSM in controlling for selection. While PSM only control for 
the bias associated to observable characteristics, DD controls for the bias associated to 
observable and unobservable time invariant characteristics. The basic assumption of this method 
is that, in the absence of the program, the growth of the outcome variable of beneficiaries would 
be equal to the growth of the outcome variable of non-beneficiaries.  
When there are large differences between beneficiaries (direct and indirect) and non-
beneficiaries, it is difficult to assume that, without the program, the outcome variable of these 
firms would have the same growth. In this case, it is possible to apply PSM to find non-
beneficiary firms, which, before the program was implemented, were similar to the beneficiaries. 
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When there are data for the years prior to implementation, it is possible to use PSM to find the 
non-beneficiaries with the same ex-ante trend in outcome variables than the beneficiaries. When 
comparing beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries that have the same characteristics prior to 
program implementation, including the trend in the outcome variables, it is easier to assume the 
equality of trends in the absence of the program. It is possible to argue that if, prior to policy 
application, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries were growing at the same rate, in the absence of 
the program, they would also growth at the same rate.  
The combination of PSM and DD involves three steps: (i) estimating the propensity score 
before the treatment takes place, (ii) defining a common support of firms through matching, and 
(iii) running a fixed-effect model on the common support. Heinrich et al. (2010) provide 
guidelines for the application of this method.  
This method works particularly well when beneficiaries enter the program in the same 
year, or when it is possible to evaluate a cohort of beneficiary firms. When firms enter the 
program, sequentially, and their participation in the program depends on past outcomes, it is 
necessary to consider the inclusion of lagged dependent variables to control for the self-selection. 
(see Angrist and Pischke, 2009: Chapter 5).  
4.3.3. Instrumental Variables  
When a CDP includes some degree of self-selection, and there is a concern that unobservable 
differences between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries might lead to biased estimates of the 
impact, this method is a powerful alternative to establish the impact of the program.  
For example, say, a cluster program aims to increase the competitiveness of firms that 
self-select into a credit program for financing the implementation of a phytosanitary certification 
that would allow them to access international markets. In this case, it is expected that some 
characteristics—such as the ability and motivation of entrepreneurs—that determine firms’ 
participation in the program might also affect their competitiveness. As is mentioned above, the 
comparison between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries will include the impact of the program, 
as well as the intrinsic characteristics of participating firms. In this case, it is not correct to use a 
regression to estimate the causal effect of program participation (Ci) on the variable of interest 
(Yi) –i.e. Yi = β Ci + ui. This is because the unobserved characteristics, captured by the error 
term (ui), would be correlated with both competitiveness (Yi) and program participation (Ci). To 
solve this problem, it is necessary to have an instrument (Zi) or set of instruments. The 
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instrument needs to satisfy two conditions: it has to predict program participation, cov(Zi,Ci) ≠0; 
that is, it has to be relevant, and it cannot to be correlated with the outcome variable, except 
through program participation (i.e., it has to be exogenous), Zi ┴ ui or cov(Zi,ui)=0.  
Although the method of instrumental variables (IV) is a powerful way in which to 
evaluate the impact of a CDP, finding an instrument after the program has been implemented is 
not always an easy task. One approach to ensure an instrument is available is to implement the 
program with a random encouragement design. In this case, some firms are randomly 
encouraged to participate through different mechanisms. For example, the program can randomly 
provide information to some firms to reduce the search cost of credit and, therefore, encourage 
firms to take the credit. In this scenario, it is reasonable to believe that firms that receive valuable 
information are more likely to participate in the program than those firms that do not. Given that 
incentives are randomly distributed across firms, there is no reason to believe that the 
encouragement mechanism is correlated to the outcome variable, making it a reasonable 
instrument.  
If not embedded in the design of the program, it is quite difficult to identify an instrument 
that can guarantee both relevance and exogeneity ex-post. In the previous example, it is difficult 
to think of a variable that might affect the participation in the program, but does not affect 
competitiveness of the firms.  
When an instrument is available, the IV approach is one of the best methods to identity 
the effect of a program. However, it also has some limitations. In particular, it can only estimate 
local average treatment effects (LATE), which means that its results are relevant only for those 
firms whose behavior is affected by the instrument (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). In the previous 
example, this implies that the results are valid only for the firms that participate in the program 
because they received the information about the program, and would not have participated 
without the information. In Impact Evaluation literature, these firms are known as compliers. The 
results are not valid for those firms that received the information and would have participated, 
even without the information (i.e., the results are not valid for always-takers). It is important to 
note that if the program was designed so that the treated and non-treated groups were 
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representative of a certain population, the IV estimates might not have external validity for the 
whole population.19 
 
4.3.4. Regression Discontinuity  
Regression discontinuity (RD) is a powerful approach to identify the effect of a CDP on firm 
performance. The approach is based on the idea that in a highly rule-based environment, some 
rules are arbitrary and, therefore, provide for natural experiments. In this framework, LATE can 
be estimated at the discontinuity that determines which firms are assigned to treatment (receive 
the program) and to control (not receive the program). Intuitively, the treated units just above the 
cut-off point are very similar to the control units just below the cut-off point. We then compare 
outcomes for units just above and below the cut-off point. RD designs come in two forms: fuzzy 
and sharp. The sharp design can be seen as a selection-on-observables description, while the 
fuzzy design leads to an instrumental-variables-type setup (Angrist and Pischke, 2009: Chapter 
6). 
 In the sharp RD, treatment is a deterministic and discontinuous function of a covariate; 
for example, the cluster policy can be applied for a particular administrative district. In this case, 
there are no untreated firms in the treated district and there are no treated firms in the untreated 
district. If a policy without spillovers is applied to firms in a particular administrative district, it 
is relatively simple to find good controls. As long as the administrative district is arbitrary, firms 
in the adjacent district could serve as controls because they are not treated, and are potentially 
equal to those treated. However, in the case of cluster programs, if firms in the adjacent district 
are part of the cluster, they cannot be used as controls because they are the indirect beneficiaries 
that receive the spillovers. 
The fuzzy RD differs from the sharp discontinuity in that the covariate does not perfectly 
determine treatment and control but, rather, influences the probability of treatment. In this case, 
the covariate affecting participation in the program can be used as an IV to predict treatment, and 
the model can be estimated using two-stage least squares. Given that this type of regression 
discontinuity can be seen as a particular case of instrumental variables, its advantages and 
limitations are the same as the advantages and limitations of the IV approach. 
                                                      
19 Also, we have to take into account the problem of weak instruments (see, for example, Bound et al. 1995). An 
instrument is weak when its correlation with the treatment is low. If the instrument is weak, it can generate bias and 
increase the standards errors of the IV estimation. 
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Summarizing, random assignment is less likely to occur in a CDP, and econometric 
techniques are needed to control the selection of firms into the program. Weighting pros and 
cons of each technique, DD (both as a combination of PSM and fixed-effect or the model with 
lagged outcome variable as additional control) appears to be a strong technique to evaluate the 
impact of the second stage of a CDP on direct and indirect beneficiaries. Although the IV and 
RD techniques are preferred, they are more demanding in terms of the design of the policy. 
 
4.4. Considering Other Crucial Aspects of the Impact Evaluation Design 
A well-designed evaluation provides additional information that is crucial for a complete 
understanding of the effects of the program, and enables the gathering of relevant policy 
recommendations that would help to reformulate the program or better design future ones. In this 
subsection, some aspects that should be always considered in the design of an impact evaluation 
are discussed. 
 
4.4.1. Timing of the Effects 
In general, it takes time for certain programs to demonstrate the desired effect on the efforts of 
firms and, in turn, their effect on economic performance. The materialization of concrete 
outcomes requires a period of gestation after a program has been implemented. The time lags 
may differ, according to the selected performance indicators. For instance, it may take more time 
before the program increase profits or productivity. More generally, the impact of different 
programs may display very different patterns over time. An intervention may generate a one-shot 
increase in the outcome, or may have a strong impact that fades out progressively over time; the 
impact of a program may only appear after a certain period, or may even generate an initial 
decrease in the outcome that is, later, increased in subsequent years. 
As a result, appropriate consideration of the timing of the effects is crucial in an impact 
evaluation of a CDP, and failing to account for these issues may lead to misleading conclusions 
and policy recommendations. A clear distinction should be made between short-, medium- and 
long-term effects to properly evaluate the costs and benefits of a public program. For instance, 
considering only a short period of time after an intervention may result in an underestimation of 
the impact, if the effects take several years to appear. On the other hand, evaluations focusing 
60 
 
only on later periods may conclude with an underestimation of the costs, if an adjustment process 
occurs within the first years. 
4.4.2. Intensity of Treatment and Dosage Effects 
While Impact Evaluation literature usually includes analyses of the binary case of participation 
against non-participation in a certain program, in practice, units may generally differ not only on 
their binary treatment status (participant versus non participant), but also on treatment intensity. 
For instance, firms may receive different amounts of public subsidy. This fact raises important 
issues to be considered, when designing an evaluation of a cluster program: the question is not 
only whether participants perform better than non-participants, but also how different intensities 
of treatment may affect performance and whether it is possible to find an “optimal level” for the 
intervention (e.g., the amount of financing that maximizes the effect on firm performance). 
4.4.3. Multiple Treatments 
In contexts where “multiple treatments” are available, the evaluator may be interested not only in 
the individual effects of each one, but also on potential interactions between them. In fact, it is 
not obvious that the effect of multiple cluster programs will be additive; instead, it may be the 
case that the combination of different interventions has multiplicative effects or, on the contrary, 
one treatment cancels out the effect of the other. Therefore, research into the joint effect of 
different types of interventions may be crucial for the design of the programs. Castillo et al. 
(2013a) provide an example of the evaluation of different types of innovation support on the 
employment and wages of firms.  
4.4.4. Heterogeneity of Impact 
In most relevant contexts, it might be hard to assume that CDPs have the same impact on all the 
beneficiaries. CDPs can have a differential effect for different groups of firms. For instance, they 
can have a stronger effect on less productive firms or on smaller firms. Restricting the analysis to 
the average impact for the whole population (or treated population) may give an incomplete or, 
at least, imprecise assessment of the impact of a program. Therefore, it is necessary to account 
for the possibility of impact heterogeneity (Heckman et al., 1997). 
The analysis of the heterogeneity is important for modifying a program or improving the 
design of future programs. For instance, important lessons about the targeting of the program can 
be obtained through this analysis. If, for example, the program is not effective for some firms, it 
has to be modified (re-designed or excluded) for this group.  
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4.5. Understanding the Policy-Coordination-Performance Relationship: How to 
Integrate Social Network Analysis Methods with Econometrics 
So far, this publication has focused on two questions: What is the impact of coordination on the 
program, and what is the impact of the program on firm performance? To answer these 
questions, two reduced form equations are proposed: 
   y1 = α1 + δ1 P + u     (1)  
    y2 = π0 + π1 P + v.    (2) 
where y1 are measures of coordination and y2 are measures of firm performance. Given that 
coordination affects firm performance (even without a program in place), one could identify, 
separately, the effect of the program on coordination and the effect of the coordination and 
program on firm performance. In this case, the following system of equations needs to be 
estimated: 
   y1 = α1 + δ1 P + u1     (3a) 
   y2 = α2 + γ y1 + δ2 P+ u2.   (3b) 
Solving the system for y2, the following reduced form for the performance measures occurs: 
   y2 = (α2+γ α1) + (γ α1+ δ2) P + (γ u1+ u2) 
    = π0 + π1 P + v.   (4) 
Note that this equation is equation (2). To identify the effects of interest, the values of π1, γ and 
π2 need to be known. The reduced forms (3a) and (4) provide estimates of α1, δ1, π0, and π1. To 
recover the information g π2, there are two equations (π0 = α2+γ α1, π1 = γ α1+ δ2) with three 
unknowns (α2, γ, δ2). Therefore, the system is not identified. 
If there is some variable that affects coordination and does not affect firm performance 
directly (i.e., that affects firm performance only through coordination), then the system is 
   y1 = α1 + δ1 P +β x+ u1     (5a) 
   y2 = α2 + γ y1 + δ2 P+ u2    (5b) 
The reduced form for y2, in this case, is equal to  
   y2 = (α2+γ α1) + (γ α1+ δ2) P + γ β x + (γ u1+ u2) 
    = π0 + π1 P + π2 x + v.   (6) 
Now there are three equations (π0 = α2+γ α1, π1 = γ α1+ δ2, π2 = γ β) and three unknowns. 
Therefore all the effects of interest can be identified. Solving these equations, the value of the 
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parameters are γ = π2/β (the effect of coordination on performance) and δ2= π1- π2/β δ1 (the effect of 
policy that is not through coordination on performance).  
To identify the effect of coordination on performance, evaluators would need to measure 
coordination through one or more of the network centrality indicators discussed in Section 2 
(Table 1). These indicators would then be used as independent variables in the regression, 
measuring impact evaluation. In this way, it is possible to determine not only whether 
coordination influences firm performance, but also what kind of coordination, measured through 
different centrality indicators, is more likely to produce beneficial effects at the firm level.  
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5. Planning, Budgeting and Other Practical Considerations: Designing the 
Evaluation Plan and Strategy 
Some practical elements of impact evaluation have already been addressed in this document (for 
instance, selecting the right methodology and gathering the data). The aim of this section is to 
review the key activities required to support the preparation and the implementation of a 
successful impact evaluation strategy. For this purpose, reference will be made to a fundamental 
tool for its success: the evaluation plan.  
Although impact evaluations are usually conceived as an ex-post activity (i.e., something 
to be done at program completion), in practice, the conceptualization and design of a successful 
evaluation should follow a program from inception to completion. For this reason, the evaluation 
plan and strategy should be key components in the preparation of a CDP, and an evaluation 
specialist should always be included in the team responsible for the program’s design and 
implementation.  
Evaluation plans can have different formats. Here, we briefly discuss the outline and 
basic contents of what is considered an appropriate plan, on the basis of the standards adopted by 
the IDB and other multilateral organizations. 
 
5.1. Main Evaluation Question(s) and Existing Knowledge 
This section includes a brief discussion of the theory of change at the basis of the CDP to be 
evaluated. Section 2 provided an example of what the theory of change is behind the 
implementation of a typical CPD. Although this theory can, generally, be applied to many CDPs, 
an in-depth discussion with policymakers and other relevant stakeholders will definitely help the 
evaluation specialist to identify the specificity of the intervention model adopted by each CDP. 
Section 2 also defined the specific evaluation questions to be answered in the impact evaluation, 
including some examples. An evaluation should be put in the perspective of its contribution to 
existing knowledge of the effectiveness of the CDP, an extremely useful exercise because it 
helps researchers and evaluators to identify what evaluation questions may need more attention 
in order to close important knowledge gaps. 
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5.2. Key Outcome Indicators 
An impact evaluation is about measurement. A detailed work on what indicators will be used in 
the analysis is critical and, often, research questions are too broadly defined because they are not 
clearly related to the measures of the expected outcomes that are SMART. For instance, a CDP 
objective may be to improve firm productivity. This may seem to be a rather specific objective, 
but measures of productivity vary significantly, depending on the specific production factor 
considered (it could be labor productivity, land productivity, and/or total factor productivity, or 
TFP) and on the specific assumption used to compute this measure (TFP, for instance, can be 
estimated in different ways). Although the choice of the specific indicators is often considered 
mostly a matter of data availability, it actually has more to do with the specific questions that the 
impact evaluation needs to seek answers to: for instance, if a CDP is expected to have a 
significant impact on the overall capacity of the beneficiary firms to manage their production, a 
measure of TFP will certainly be more accurate (specific, achievable, and relevant) than a 
measure of labor productivity.  
A properly prepared evaluation plan should, therefore, show the consistency between 
research questions and indicators. In addition, for each indicator, the formula used for its 
computation should be clearly defined, and the frequency with which it will be calculated over 
the duration of the intervention should be clearly defined.  
5.3.  Evaluation Methodology20 
In selecting the methodology to be used for an empirical analysis, it should always be 
remembered that the object of the analysis determines the methodology, not the other way 
around. So, in the case of an impact evaluation, the specific characteristics of the program 
determine which method can be used. Section 3 has extensively discussed what the main 
advantages and limitations of the methods are that can be used for the estimation of the effects of 
a CDP. In general terms, the main factor that differentiates these methodologies is how a 
counterfactual can be defined or, more practically, how a control group can be identified. The 
following will suggest a list of project characteristics that, without doubt, will affect how a 
comparison group can be identified. 
                                                      
20 This section mainly refers to experimental and quasi-experimental approaches. Similar considerations for 
approaches using SNA techniques are developed in Sections 2 and 3. It builds upon Chapter 10 of Gertler et al. 
(2011) and Crespi et al. (2011).  
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a) Targeting. Equitable, transparent, and accountable targeting standards are a necessary 
precondition for proper identification of a comparison group. These rules can vary from 
program to program, but usually they define: (i) who is eligible for the program benefits 
(for instance, all the furniture producers with less than 10 employees, located in a certain 
municipality); (ii) the prioritization criterion (for instance, priority will be given to firms 
that apply first or to firms that submit the best business plan); (iii) the administrative 
mechanism to be used (for instance, one call for proposal a year or an “open window” 
approach); (iv) how many individuals in the eligible population are expected to be 
supported over a certain period (for instance, 500 firms over a five-year period); and the 
specific timing of the selection (for instance, 100 firms a year).  
It is quite clear how these targeting standards can affect the selection of a 
comparison group. For instance, when the target population is defined in such a way that 
the eligible population is much greater than the expected beneficiaries—and no strong 
prioritization criterion has been defined—then a randomized evaluation is the most 
feasible methodological option.  
The targeting standards should be designed consistently with the program’s 
overall rationale and, therefore, are usually “a given” for the evaluation specialist.21 
Often, some standards can be equally valid from a programmatic point of view, in which 
case the specialist may propose the adoption of an alternative that would allow the 
implementation of the most rigorous evaluation method. 
 
b) Size of the intervention. Econometric methods require a minimum number of 
observations to detect a certain level of effects. This minimum sample size can be easily 
calculated, following the procedure described in Section 3 herein. It is clear that the 
extent of the program strongly affects the possibility to apply any of the proposed 
methodologies. In some cases, a CDP could be simply too small for its effects to be 
estimated (or, at least, some of its effects, given that the sample size varies according to 
the specific outcome variable used in the estimation). In the case of small programs, the 
                                                      
21 However, sometimes they may be defined on the basis of some institutional routine that has not really a clear 
connection with the project design. For instance, an organization may feel more comfortable in working with an 
“open-window” scheme, because it has always managed policy instruments, for which the choice among alternative 
investment projects has never been a relevant factor. 
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choice of methodologies should favor those that include multiple observations of the 
outcome variable over time. In fact, a reduced level of n (number of individuals/firms) 
can be “empowered” with a higher number of T (times these individuals/firms, which are 
observed).  
 
c) Budget and data availability. Funding is always an issue, especially when it relates to 
allocating resources to an impact evaluation. This is probably due to the fact that such 
resources are not perceived as directly advantageous to the end beneficiaries of public 
programs. In actuality, they are advantageous, as they provide for a better understanding 
of what works and what does not work—probably one of the best investments in public 
policy.  
In reality, budget considerations usually have very little to do with the selection of 
impact evaluation methodology. Perhaps because of some existing biases, policymakers 
often assume that there is a positive correlation between cost and the rigor of the 
methodology applied, which is incorrect. There is no reason why a randomized control 
trial (RCT) should cost more than a non-experimental methodology (in actual fact, an 
RCT may even cost less, given that the data processing is, in theory, much simpler than 
in most quasi-experimental approaches).  
A budget can (and should) influence the choice of the impact evaluation 
methodology only in relation to data availability. As will be discussed in greater detail, a 
significant part of the costs of an impact evaluation are related to the need to work with 
micro data and, in many cases, to generate these data through ad-hoc data collections. 
However, these costs can be avoided, or dramatically reduced, when the evaluation can 
rely on existing data in which case, the choice of the evaluation methodology can be also 
driven by the opportunity to take advantage of existing (and available) data. A note of 
caution, however, is required: “data-driven” evaluations are not advocated, which would 
require a focus on studies for which data are already available or, even worse, would 
limit the evaluation questions to those that can be answered with pre-existing 
information. What is simply suggested is that, prior to considering a collection of new 
data, a thorough review of the existing data and an evaluation strategy be made, based on 
that data.  
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5.4. Sampling strategy and data collection 
By this stage, the evaluation plan should have already introduced the basic criteria for the 
identification of the population (both treatment and control groups) that will be the object of the 
study. A more detailed discussion on the following topics should be included: (i) the unit of 
analysis and the strategy for its determination; (ii) the size of the sample to be used in the study; 
(iii) the distribution of the sample between treated and comparison groups; and (iv) a strategy for 
data collection, all of which were discussed in Section 3. 
5.5. Resources  
To be comprehensive, the plan should clearly determine the resources required for an evaluation. 
The following three factors are key elements: (a) to form a team and establish the responsibilities 
and tasks of each member; (b) to create a budget and work plan; (c) to identify source(s) of 
funding. 
a) Evaluation team: responsibilities and tasks. Ideally, the team should be composed of a 
combination of external evaluators and operational experts (those who were involved in the 
implementation of the program). The external evaluators will (i) exercise more 
independence, since they have a significant stake in the success of the evaluation (rather than 
on the program’s success) and have a desire to achieve a high degree of objectivity and 
credibility; and (ii) be more focused, as they will concentrate exclusively on the evaluation 
exercise, rather than program implementation. The operational experts will provide (i) a clear 
understanding of program objectives and the execution of mechanisms; (ii) easy and timely 
access to program data; (iii) smooth dialogue with the authorities; and (iv) stronger buy-in of 
the evaluation results.  
The plan should include the qualifications and technical expertise required for 
assignment. Depending on the program being evaluated and the resources available, the team 
should, collectively, include the following: 
• Design capability for evaluations, including choice of evaluation method; strong 
statistical background; 
• negotiating skills when liaising with key stakeholders regarding evaluation design; 
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• operational expertise for data collection22, including relating to questionnaire and 
sampling plan development; 
• Systems development expertise to promote an independent study with integrity; 
• Statistical analysis management for estimate impacts; 
• Presentation experience to report the findings to a wide audience, including academics 
and policymakers. 
It is important to keep in mind that the operation of the program and the implementation of 
the evaluation are interlinked and, therefore, should not be dealt with separately. The IDB 
and similar institutions consider the following as best practice to ensure good linkage 
between both:23 
• The evaluation team should have one or more key qualified people as part of the 
operations team (both within the IDB and with the respective government or 
implementing agency), who will participate in the design of the evaluation and be 
accountable for its implementation. These members can play a critical role in ensuring 
that the program implementation actually follows the agreed framework. Should there be 
deviations from the initial design, they can work with the evaluation experts to resolve 
the issue, thus minimizing the impact on the integrity of the process. 
• The evaluation team should include independent technical experts who, in addition to 
providing advice on such elements as methodologies, measures, and sampling, do not 
have a vested interest in the project, and can guarantee independence and credibility. 
They can include evaluation experts from within the IDB, external consultants (including 
academics), or outside firms (technical assistance firms, think tanks, research institutes, 
universities, etc.).  
 
Budget and work plan. The evaluation plan should include a careful estimate of the 
resources needed to fund the exercise. For this purpose, the design should contain a work 
plan that describes each team member’s responsibility and at what point an activity should 
                                                      
22 If the project team plans to procure external individuals or firms to help conduct the impact evaluation, it can be 
advantageous to consider the evaluation and data collection as two separate activities that can potentially be 
executed by two different individuals or agencies. For this model to be successful, the two entities will need to work 
cohesively, with some coordination by the team leader. 
23 We are indebted to Sebastian Martinez for these suggestions. 
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take place, as well as a budget for each activity, in order to accurately determine funding 
requirements, mobilize resources, and ensure appropriate levels of funding.24 Table 4 
presents an example of a budget. 
As Table 4 illustrates, an important driver of evaluation costs is the funding needed for 
the data collection. In a recent review of the World Bank’s impact evaluations, it was 
concluded that over half of the resources were devoted to data collection activities, alone. 
This cost depends on various factors, but two key ones that should be considered during the 
early stage of design are the size of the sample and the number of rounds of data collection 
that is necessary. The Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) Manual provides cost 
estimates for collecting data through household surveys, based on country experience. 
Chapter 10 in Gertler et al. (2011) provides costs associated with various impact evaluations 
that were conducted by The World Bank. 
 Source of funding. There are many potential sources of funding for an impact 
evaluation exercise, the main one being the government that is implementing the program. 
While governments often view evaluation resources as competing with resources meant for 
the programs, themselves, it is essential for a government to recognize that impact appraisals 
are critical to improving a program’s objectives in terms of timely interventions and 
improvement in the allocation of resources across interventions. Thus, budget allocations 
should be made not only on the basis of cost, but also—as for any investment—on the basis 
of the benefits. In many cases, while the cost of an impact evaluation exercise may appear 
relatively high in absolute terms, the investment in producing evidence on what works and 
what does not work could present tremendous returns on the decisions of whether to disband 
a program, modify it, or scale up public programs.  
At the IDB, potential funding for evaluations include the resources from (i) the program, itself 
(IDB and/or counterpart funding), (ii) technical cooperation (TC), (iii) operational inputs (OI), 
(iv) knowledge and capacity building projects (KCPs), and (iv) departments/divisions. Sources 
outside the IDB include organizations, such as the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation 
(3ie), Global Development Network (GDN) and U.S. National Institutes for Health (NIH). 
 
 
                                                      
24 Gorgens, M., Kusek, J. Z. (2009). 
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Table 4. Budget and Work Plan for an Impact Evaluation 
Activities Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Responsible Cost (US$) 
Funding 
Source Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
I. Impact Evaluation                               
Personnel                               
  
Monitoring and 
Evaluation (M&E) 
specialist at executing 
agency                               
  Principal researcher                                
  Research assistant                               
  Statistics specialist                               
  Field coordinator                               
Travel                               
  
International and/or 
domestic air travel                               
  Ground transportation                               
  Per diem                               
Data collection                               
  Design of questionnaire                               
  Pilot testing                               
  Training                               
   Travel and per diem                               
  
Survey materials, 
equipment                               
   Printed questionnaire                               
  Field personnel                               
   Interviewers                               
   Supervisors                               
  
Transport (vehicles and 
fuel)                               
   Drivers                               
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Data entry                               
  
Data cleansing and data 
entry                               
                                  
Analysis and diffusion of 
data                               
  Workshops                               
  Documents, reports                               
Other                               
  Office space                               
  Communications                               
  Software                               
Impact evaluation report                               
  Final Report                               
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5.6. Diffusion of Results 
A component of coordinating evaluation activities includes the timing, content, and delivery of 
the appraisal report. A report with baseline data will generally cover the success of the data 
collection and whether a control group representing a reasonable counterfactual to the 
comparison group was done within the months following data collection. A report on any post-
treatment data collection following a survey should also be included. Finally, the report should 
describe all the rounds of data collection, based on the indicators, each of which should be 
included in the evaluation plan. 
The final results of the evaluation should be disseminated, using appropriate methods of 
communication. Experts may tend to steer towards journals through which scientific articles can 
be effective in not only disseminating the knowledge gained from an evaluation among 
renowned scholars and policymakers, but also in guaranteeing the credibility of the results. 
Scientific articles should not be considered the only avenue of communication to describe 
the outcome of an impact evaluation. Other methods of communication should be used, such as: 
(i) executive summaries for management, high-level civil servants, and ministries; (ii) press 
releases; and (iii) videos and presentations for civil society organizations and the general public 
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6. Conclusions  
The idea of promoting the formation and development of clusters has become, increasingly, a 
global concept, with a proliferation of programs having been implemented. They are based on 
the assumption that firm-level performance will benefit from agglomeration and, in turn, 
agglomeration will facilitate coordination, particularly in instances where the failure of 
coordination can significantly hamper the development of industry in certain localities. CDPs 
have been shown to create incentive and to promote public support to facilitate the interaction 
and coordination among all agents (private-private and public-private).  
Most CDPs include two stages: one targets the coordination of the cluster’s actors to 
prioritize investment decisions, where industry and location specific externalities are accounted 
for; and one implements the actions defined among the priorities. CDPs can include the co-
financing of public infrastructure and club goods that can become a catalyst for new investment 
projects. 
Do CDPs work? Will they be effective in producing results? Do they have an impact on 
enterprise development? These guidelines offer an insight into the methods that can help answer 
these fundamental questions through solid quantitative evidence. Answers in any event, will be 
rather difficult to arrive at, since the process of cluster development and the effort to support it 
are very complex and multidimensional, and involve decisions on an individual and collective 
basis. Results will depend on the level of coordination that is achieved and on the actions 
undertaken as a result of improved coordination and strategy-setting of the relevant actors. A 
rigorous appraisal of the effectiveness of these programs will indicate, at least, whether 
coordination among cluster actors do, in fact, change throughout the project, how this takes 
place, and whether CDPs are the actual cause of the observed results. 
The techniques of Social Network Analysis (SNA) can be employed to assess the 
evolution of coordination among cluster actors, with the requirement that network indicators are 
observed before and after the implementation of the CDPs. Whilst this particular analysis can 
assist in monitoring and assessing the process of coordination and its changes throughout the 
program, other qualitative and contextual information can also assist in interpreting the data and, 
thus, increase the reliability of results. However, in order to properly assess the impact of CDPs, 
their causality needs to be explored further by the application of additional quantitative methods. 
In fact, the effects cannot be attributed to the program, itself, unless a proper counterfactual is 
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built in, such as what would have happened to the beneficiaries in the absence of the program. 
By definition, this particular counterfactual cannot be observed, but the application of 
experimental and quasi-experimental techniques can help construct control groups of non-
beneficiaries to approximate the counterfactual—already explained at length in the text. 
Furthermore, a detailed observation of cases and specific interviews can help regarding the 
interpretation of results derived from the application of both SNA and experimental and quasi-
experimental techniques. 
To summarize, clusters and cluster development programs are diverse and multi-
dimensional phenomena that require a variety of instruments to be fully understood and assessed. 
The quantitative tools that have been proposed in this publication should be considered as 
complementary and not as alternatives, with each applied as a means to strengthen the 
explanatory capacity of the other. Each tool requires specific and challenging data analysis that 
can be achieved with careful resource planning and having the appropriate team skill set. The 
overarching objective is to build new and solid evidence on the effectiveness of CPDs and their 
respective policies. This is crucial in order to justify the funding of these programs with public 
resources, ensure that recipients are accountable, and, more importantly, to learn how to improve 
program effectiveness and contribute to improving livelihoods through enterprise and socio-
economic development. 
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